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Abstract
In this dissertation we collect some results about “interactive realizability”, a realizability
semantics that extends the Brouwer-Heyting-Kolmogorov interpretation to (sub-)classical
logic, more precisely to first-order intuitionistic arithmetic (Heyting Arithmetic, HA) ex-
tended by the law of the excluded middle restricted to Σ01 formulas (EM1), a system moti-
vated by its interest in proof mining. These results are three interconnected works, listed
below.
• We describe the interactive interpretation of a classical proof involving real numbers.
The statement we prove is a simple but non-trivial fact about points in the real plane.
The proof employs EM1 to deduce properties of the ordering on the real numbers,
which is undecidable and thus problematic from a constructive point of view.
• We present a new set of reductions for derivations in natural deduction that can extract
witnesses from closed derivations of simply existential formulas in HA + EM1. The
reduction we present are inspired by the informal idea of learning by making falsifiable
hypothesis and checking them, and by the interactive realizability interpretation. We
extract the witnesses directly from derivations in HA + EM1 by reduction, without
encoding derivations by a realizability interpretation.
• We give a new presentation of interactive realizability with a more explicit syntax.
We express interactive realizers by means of an abstract framework that applies the
monadic approach used in functional programming to modified realizability, in order
to obtain less strict notions of realizability that are suitable to classical logic. In par-
ticular we use a combination of the state and exception monads in order to capture the
learning-from-mistakes nature of interactive realizers.
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Chapter 1
Preface
1.1 Proofs and Computations
From the beginning intuitionistic logic has been linked to the idea of computation. In hind-
sight, this is already implicit in the Brouwer-Heyting-Kolmogorov (BHK) interpretation,
which is presented in terms of proofs, constructions and transformations thereof (or prob-
lems in the case of Kolmogorov).
The connection becomes more evident with the introduction of recursive realizability by
Kleene in [14] and, later, modified realizability by Kreisel in [15]. Realizability semantics
can be thought of as formalizations of the BHK interpretation, where the vague notions of
proof, construction and transformation are replaced with the notions of computable func-
tionals.
The full explicitation of this connection is the Curry-Howard correspondence, [13],
where the whole proof is seen as a program and the conclusion as the type or the speci-
fication of the program. While interpreting an intuitionistic proof as a computation is quite
natural (in hindsight), this is not the case for classical proofs.
A computational interpretation of a classical proof can be obtained by first translating a
classical proof into an intuitionstic one by means of double-negation translation. This ap-
proach was used by Go¨del to prove relative consistency results for classical and intuitionistic
arithmetic. However, the double-negation translation transforms informative statements into
non-informative ones, so the computations we can extract in this way yield trivial results.
v
Moreover, this approach is indirect, while proofs and computations are almost undistinguish-
able in intuitionstic logic.
We quote from [23]:
Until around 1990 there was a widespread consensus to the effect that “there is
no Curry-Howard isomorphism for classical logic.” However, at that time Tim
Griffin made a path-breaking discovery which have convinced most critics that
classical logics have something to offer the Curry-Howard isomorphism.
In [12], Griffin extends the Curry-Howard correspondence to classical proofs, employing
functional programs with first-class continuations. In Griffin’s own words:
The programming language Scheme contains the control construct call/cc that
allows access to the current continuation (the current control context). This,
in effect, provides Scheme with first-class labels and jumps. We show that
the well-known formulae-as-types correspondence, which relates a constructive
proof of a formula α to a program of type α, can be extended to a typed Ide-
alized Scheme. What is surprising about this correspondence is that it relates
classical proofs to typed programs.
After Griffin’s discovery, other interpretations extending the Curry-Howard correspon-
dence to classical logic have been put forward. In [19], Parigot introduces the λµ-calculus,
an extension of lambda calculus with an additional kind of variables for subterms.
In [16], Krivine devised a new notion of realizability for classical logic called “classical
realizability”. In classical realizability realizers are written in an untyped lambda calculus
with save/restore operators for the execution context and they are interpreted by an abstract
machine that allows the manipulation of execution contexts, represented as “stacks” of ar-
guments.
Interactive realizability is a more recent proof interpretation for classical logic and the
main focus of this dissertation.
1.2 Interactive Realizability
Introduced by Berardi and de’Liguoro in [5, 6], interactive realizability is a technique for
understanding and extracting the computational content in the case of the sub-classical logic
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HA + EM1 (Heyting Arithmetic extended by the law of the excluded middle restricted to Σ01
formulas).
The main inspiration sources for interactive realizability are Coquand’s game theoretic
semantics for classical arithmetic and Gold’s idea of learning in the limit.
Gold original interest is language learnability, for instance a child learning the grammar
of a language by repeated exposure to correct sentences. We expect that the child will
eventually learn the language and stop making mistakes when speaking. The interesting
point is that we do not know how many sentences he needs to complete the learning, In [11],
he defines what it means to learn the answer of some question from an unlimited amount of
evidence and in a finite time as follows:
The purpose of this paper is to discuss the classes of problems that can be solved
by infinitely long decision procedures in the following sense: An algorithm is
given which, for any problem of the class, generates an infinitely long sequence
of guesses. The problem will be said to be solved in the limit if, after some finite
point in the sequence, all the guesses are correct and the same (in case there is
more than one correct answer).
In [9], Coquand presents a novel game theoretic semantics. As customary in game se-
mantics, each formula defines a game for two players: ∃loise, trying to show that the formula
is true and ∀belard, trying to show that it is not. A formula is then validated by the existence
of a winning strategy for ∃loise.
Coquand takes the game for intuitionistic logic and extends it to classical logic by al-
lowing ∃loise to retract her moves: instead of answering to the last move made by ∀belard,
she can change her mind on her previous moves and go back to any past position. Thus a
new game with asymmetric backtracking is defined, where ∃loise holds the advantage and
the existence of a backtracking strategy validates classical logic.
In [5, 6], Berardi and de’Liguoro recast Coquand’s idea of backtracking strategy as a
strategy for learning the truth of classical statements in the limit in Gold’s sense. Moreover,
they present their proof interpretation as a realizability rather than game theoretic semantics
and write backtracking strategies as learning algorithms in a simply typed λ-calculus with
primitive recursion.
The aim of interactive realizability as a proof interpretation for classical logic is to ex-
vii
press the computational content of a suitable subset of classical proofs in an understandable
form. This is the motivation for its peculiar features, which we summarize in the following.
• The interactive interpretation is “faithful” to the classical proof, meaning that the com-
putation follows closely the original proof. This is possible since interactive realizabil-
ity interprets the proof directly, without resorting to proof translations. We also avoid
adding computations that are not explicitly present in the proof, for instance blind
searches to realize existential statements.
• A common feature of computational interpretation of classical logic is that they ex-
tract programs that manipulate the execution context, that is, they need continuations.
However, the use of continuations can make a program hard to follow. Interactive
realizability uses the idea of learning to explain the manipulations of the execution
contexts that are needed to backtrack. In particular this is accomplished by means of
a knowledge state, that is increased during the learning process and that act as a guide
in the exectution of the interactive interpretation.
• Interactive realizability is compositional, meaning that the interactive interpretations
of different parts of a single proofs can be given independently and then composed to
obtain the interactive interpretation of the whole proof.
• In this dissertation we only consider proofs where the law of the excluded middle
is restricted to Σ01 formulas. In this case interactive realizers use simpler constructs
like states and exceptions instead of continuations in order to handle the backtracking
nature of the computational content of classical proofs.
viii
Chapter 2
Preliminaries
In this chapter we introduce the notation and the tools we shall in the rest of the thesis. Our
analysis is mainly concerned with proofs in first-order arithmetic, both intuitionistic (HA)
and classical (PA). We also introduce a simply typed lambda calculus, which we use to give
realizability interpretations of proofs.
2.1 Constructive Arithmetic in Natural Deduction
In this section, we introduce Heyting Arithmetic and the axiom for the law of the excluded
middle, which will be the logical setting of the whole dissertation. We briefly describe the
language of first-order logic, the rules of minimal logic in natural deduction, the axioms and
rules of arithmetic and the restricted excluded middle axiom schemes.
2.1.1 Primitive Recursive Functions and Predicates
In the language of arithmetic we include symbols for all the primitive recursive functions
and predicates in arithmetic. We briefly recall their definition.
We only consider arithmetical functions, that is, functions from the natural numbers to
the natural numbers, which we denote with N. These functions take n arguments for some
natural number n and are called n-ary. We use the metavariables f (n), g(n), h(n) for n-ary
functions.
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Primitive recursive functions are defined by induction. The basic primitive recursive
functions are the following:
the constant function the 0-ary constant function 0,
the successor function the 1-ary successor function succ, which returns the successor of its
argument,
the projection functions for every n ≥ 1 and each i with 1 ≤ i ≤ n, the n-ary projection
function Pni , which returns its i-th argument:
Pni (x1, . . . , xn) = xi.
More complex primitive recursive functions can be obtained by combining basic or pre-
viously defined primitive recursive function. Given the primitive recursive functions g(n),
h(m)1 , . . . , h
(m)
k and h
(k+2), we can define new primitive recursive functions in two ways:
composition the composition of g with h1, . . . , hn, i.e. the m-ary function:
comp(g, h1, . . . , hn) = g(h1(x1, . . . , xm), . . . , hn(x1, . . . , xm)),
is primitive recursive;
primitive recursion the (k + 1)-ary function recgh is defined as the primitive recursion of
g and h, i.e. the function:
recgh(0, x1, . . . , xk) = g(x1, . . . , xk),
recgh(succ(y), x1, . . . , xk) = h(y, rec(y, x1, . . . , xk), x1, . . . , xk),
is primitive recursive.
Now we can define primitive recursive predicates by saying that they are the predicates
whose characteristic function is a primitive recursive function. More precisely an n-ary
predicate p is primitive recursive if and only if there is a primitive recursive f (n) such that:
p(x1, . . . , xn) if and only if f (x1, . . . , xn) = 1,
for any x1, . . . , xn ∈ N.
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2.1.2 The Language of Arithmetic
In this subsection we define the language of first-order arithmetic.
Let {Fn}n∈N and {Rn}n∈N be two indexed sets of non-logical symbols. We assume that
Fn contains symbols for all and only the primitive recursive (total) functions of arity n, that
is, functions in Nn → N. Compare our language with the language of Primitive Recursive
Arithmetic (PRA) [22]. Since we have induction on quantified formulas, unlike in PRA, in
principle we only need to define zero constant, the successor function, addition and multi-
plication (see [17, p. 155]). However, we prefer a richer language with symbols for all the
recursive functions and relations, because it is simpler to use.
Similarly we assume that Rn contains symbols for all and only the primitive recursive
relations of arity n, that is, subsets ofNn. We use the metavariables f (n), g(n), h(n) for function
symbols and p(n), q(n), r(n) for relation symbols, omitting the superscript when we do not need
it.
The 0-ary symbols are called constants. We assume that some standard symbols are
present:
F0 F1 F2 R0 R2
0 succ +, · >,⊥ =, <,≤
For the sake of readability we informally write n instead of succn 0 and we shall use the infix
notation for binary functions and relations.
Let V be an enumerable set of variable symbols. We use the metavariables x, y, z for
variable symbols.
We use the metavariable t for arithmetic terms, which are defined as:
t F x | f (n)(t1, . . . , tn)
We use the metavariables P,Q,R for atomic formulas, defined as:
P F p(n)(t1, . . . , tn)
Finally, we use the metavariables A, B,C for (well formed) formulas, defined as:
A F P | B ∧C | B ∨C | B→ C | ∀x. B | ∃x. B
The entire grammar is given more concisely in Table 2.1.
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Table 2.1: The language of first-order arithmetic.
Metavariables Definition
function symbols f (n), g(n), h(n) elements of Fn
relation symbols p(n), q(n), r(n) elements of Rn
arithmetic variables x, y, z elements ofV
arithmetic terms t t F x | f (n)(t1, . . . , tn)
atomic formulas P,Q,R P F p(n)(t1, . . . , tn)
formulas A, B,C
A F P | B ∧C | B ∨C |
| B→ C | ∀x. B | ∃x. B
We write ♣[x1, . . . , xn B t1, . . . , tn] for the simultaneous substitution of the variables
x1, . . . , xn with the terms t1, . . . , tn in the expression ♣ (a term or a formula).
We use a compact notation for bounded quantification on natural numbers:
∀x ≤ t. .A stands for ∀x. x ≤ t → A,
∃x ≤ t. .A stands for ∃x. x ≤ t ∧ A.
The language of first-order arithmetic is the language of both Heyting Arithmetic and
Peano Arithmetic.
2.1.3 Reduction on Arithmetic Terms
In this subsection we introduce a reduction on arithmetic terms. Since arithmetic terms are
build from recursive primitive functions, we can transform the equations defining them into
reductions in a natural way.
A term t is a numeral if it is either 0 or succu for some numeral u. We consider numerals
as the basic arithmetic terms, so we do not reduce them.
Consider a term t build by composition, for instance:
f (t1, . . . , ti, . . . , tn).
The first option is to reduce one of the arguments: for any 0 < i ≤ n, if ti reduces to t′i , then
f (t1, . . . , ti, . . . , tn)→ f (t1, . . . , t′i , . . . , tn).
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The second option is to reduce the whole term. In this case which reduction we use depends
on how the primitive recursive function denoted by f is defined. As we said, if f denotes
zero or the successor function, it does not reduce. If f denotes a projection function Pni , then
it reduces as follows:
f (t1, . . . , tn)→ ti,
exactly as in the definition of Pni . If f denotes the composition of functions whose symbols
are g, h1, . . . , hn, then it reduces as follows:
comp(g, h1, . . . hn) = g(h1(t1, . . . , tm), . . . , hn(t1, . . . , tm)).
If f the primitive recursion of two other functions whose symbols are g and h, then f reduces
as follows:
f (0, t1, . . . , tk)→ g(t1, . . . , tk),
f (succ(u), t1, . . . , tk)→ h(u, rec(u, t1, . . . , tk), t1, . . . , tk),
depending on the form of the first argument.
We basically described how to compute primitive recursive functions. This reduction is
strongly normalizing and the normal form is unique. In the case of closed term the normal
form is a numeral.
We can extend this reduction from terms to formulas, by reducing the terms contained
in a formula. Strong normalization and uniqueness are preserved.
2.1.4 Axioms and Rules of Intuitionistic Logic
In this subsection we describe natural deduction as a notation for formal proofs and the
axioms and the rules of intuitionistic logic with equality.
A derivation is a formal diagram that describes a proof. We write derivations in natural
deduction, that is, as labeled trees of annotated formulas, with the requirement that the any
subtree conforms to one of a number of patterns called rules of inference or simply rules. An
annotated formula consists of a formula, the name of the rule it conforms to and an unique
label. In a proof tree the same formula can and often does appear in more than one place.
Similarly a rule can be applied many times. In order to distinguish these multiple instance,
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when reasoning about the structure of a derivation we speak about formula occurrences and
rule instances.
We draw derivations with the root at the bottom. The top formulas of the tree are axiom
instances if they are derived from a rule with no premisses, discharged assumption instances
if they are discharged by a rule instance below them or open assumption instances if they
are not.
In an elimination rule the premiss containing the logical operator being eliminated is
called the major premiss; the other premisses are called minor premisses. We follow a
common convention in writing rules and place the major premiss in the leftmost position.
For introduction and atomic rules we consider all premisses to be major premisses.
We call a rule atomic when its assumptions and conclusion are all atomic formulas. We
call atomic axiom an atomic rule without premisses.
There are two notations for natural deduction that differ on how they represent open
assumptions. For instance, consider the implication introduction rule written in two ways:
[A]α
...
B→ I αA→ B
Γ, α : A ` B→ I α
Γ ` A→ B
We say that the leftmost rule is written in Gentzen’s style and the rightmost one in sequent
style. In the Gentzen’s style rule the open assumption A is inside square brackets with a
superscript label α to show that it is discharged by the rule also labeled with α. Note that
labels are essential: if we remove them we may not know which rule instance discharges an
occurrence of an open assumption.
In the sequent style rule all the open assumptions a formula depends on are in the list
(metavariable Γ) of couples of labels and formulas that precedes the symbol `. The fact
that the rule discharges an open assumption A is clear from the fact that A is in the open
assumption list of the premiss and is not in the list of the conclusion.
The simplest rule is the identity rule, that shows how to use an open assumption: they say
that if we assumed a formula A we can derive A, whence the name. When using Gentzen’s
style it is usually left implicit, but it needs to be written in sequent style. We give both
versions:
[A]α
Id A
, Id Γ ` A ,
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where Γ contains α : A for some label α.
We can now present the rules of minimal logic, a subset of intuitionistic and of classical
logic. It consists of ten rules, one introduction rule and one elimination rule for each of the
five logical connectives. They are listed in Gentzen’s style in Figure 2.1 and in sequent style
in Figure 2.2. The usual restrictions apply to rules ∀I and ∃E: in ∀I we assume that x is not
free in any assumption in Γ; in ∃E we assume that x ≡ y or y is not free in A and y is not free
in any assumption in Γ.
Figure 2.1: Rules for minimal logic, in Gentzen’s style natural deduction.
A B∧I A ∧ B
A ∧ B∧ER A
A ∧ B∧EL B
A∨IR A ∨ B
B∨IL A ∨ B ∨EL A ∨ B
[A]α
...
C
[B]α
...
Cα
C
→ I
[A]α
...
Bα
A→ B
A→ B A→ E B
A∀I ∀x. A
∀x. A∀E A[x B t]
A[x B t]∃I ∃x. A ∃E ∃x. A
[A[x B y]]α
...
Cα
C
Intuitionistic logic has all the rules of minimal logic with the addition of the ex falso
quodlibet rule:
⊥⊥E A
which can be thought of as an elimination rule for the atomic formula ⊥. For technical
reason we prefer to have atomic rules when possible, so instead of the ⊥E rule we consider
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Figure 2.2: Rules for minimal logic, in sequent style natural deduction.
Γ ` A Γ ` B∧I
Γ ` A ∧ B
Γ ` A ∧ B∧ER
Γ ` A
Γ ` A ∧ B∧EL
Γ ` B
Γ ` A∨IR
Γ ` A ∨ B
Γ ` B∨IL
Γ ` A ∨ B
Γ ` A ∨ B Γ, αk+1 : A ` C Γ, αk+1 : B ` C∨EL
Γ ` C
Γ, αk+1 : A ` B→ I
Γ ` A→ B
Γ ` A→ B Γ ` A→ E
Γ ` B
Γ ` A∀I
Γ ` ∀x. A
Γ ` ∀x. A∀E
Γ ` A[x B t]
Γ ` A[x B t]∃I
Γ ` ∃x. A
Γ ` ∃x. A Γ, αk+1 : A[x B y] ` C∃E
Γ ` C
its restricted version, where the conclusion can only be an atomic formula:
⊥⊥E0 P
Then ⊥E0 is an atomic rule. The ⊥E rule is admissible given the ⊥E0 rule. It is easy to prove
by induction on the structure of the conclusion of the ⊥E rule. For instance we can prove
A = P→ Q from ⊥:
⊥⊥E0 Q→ I P→ Q
First-order logic always assumes the existence of a binary relation symbol = and axioms
and rules defining it as an equivalence relation compatible with functions and relations.
These axioms and rules are given in Gentzen’s style in Figure 2.3 and in sequent style in
Figure 2.4. Note that they are all atomic.
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Figure 2.3: Rules for the equality predicate, in Gentzen’s style natural deduction.
Refl t = t
t = uSym u = t
t = u u = vTrans t = v
t1 = u1 . . . tn = unSubF
f (n)(t1, . . . , tn) = f (n)(u1, . . . , un)
t1 = u1 . . . tn = un p(n)(t1, . . . , tn)SubR
p(n)(u1, . . . , un)
Figure 2.4: Rules for the equality predicate, in sequent style natural deduction.
Refl
Γ ` t = t Γ ` t = uSym Γ ` u = t
Γ ` t = u Γ ` u = vTrans
Γ ` t = v
Γ ` t1 = u1 . . . tn = unSubF
Γ ` f (n)(t1, . . . , tn) = f (n)(u1, . . . , un)
Γ ` t1 = u1 . . . tn = un Γ ` p(n)(t1, . . . , tn)SubR
Γ ` p(n)(u1, . . . , un)
2.1.5 Axiom and Rules of Arithmetic
In this subsection we present the axioms and the rules of Heyting Arithmetic (HA).
The rules defining the functions symbols succ,+ and · are in Figure 2.5.
Figure 2.5: Axioms and rules for the successor, addition and multiplication, in Gentzen’s style
natural deduction.
succ t = 0Zero ⊥
succ t = succ(u)
Succ t = u
Add0 t + 0 = t Addsucc t + succ(u) = succ(t) + u
Mult0 t · 0 = 0 Mult+ t · succ(u) = t · u + t
10 Chapter 2. Preliminaries
Induction
The last rule we need to add to have the full HA is induction. Induction can be thought of as
the requirement that any natural number can be written as succ(. . . (succ(0))). In first-order
logic is usually expressed by saying that, for any formula A, if A(0) holds and A(x + 1) holds
whenever A(x) holds, then A holds for any natural number. Induction has many different but
equivalent formulations and it can be written as either an axiom or a rule. The most common
formulation is the following induction axiom schema:
A[x B 0] ∧ (∀x. A→ A[x B succ(x)])→ ∀x. A,
where A is any formula. This axiom can be written as the induction rule in Gentzen’s style:
A[x B 0]
[A]α
...
A[x B succ(x)]
Ind α∀x. A
,
or in sequent style:
Γ ` A[x B 0] Γ, α : A ` A[x B succ(x)]
Ind α
Γ ` ∀x. A .
An related axiom is complete or course-of-values induction, which states that if A(x)
holds whenever A(y) holds for all y < x then A holds for any natural number. The axiom for
complete induction is written as:
(∀y < x. A[x B y])→ ∀x. A
While this axiom appear to be stronger than the induction axiom we just defined, it is actually
equivalent. This can be seen by considering the standard induction rule for the formula
B ≡ ∀y < x. A[x B y].
For more details see [21, p. 213].
We can write a rule for complete induction in Gentzen’s style:
[∀y < x. A[x B y]]α
...
ACInd α∀x. A
,
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or in sequent style:
Γ, α : ∀y < x. A[x B y] ` A
CInd α
Γ ` ∀x. A .
Now we have all the ingredients we need in order to define Heyting Arithmetic, the
standard intuitionistic theory of arithmetic.
Definition 1 (Heyting Arithmetic). Heyting Arithmetic (HA) is defined as the first-order
logic theory whose language is the language of arithmetic and whose axioms and rules are
the following:
• the identity rule,
• the rules of minimal logic,
• the rule for ex falso quodlibet restricted to atomic formulas,
• the axiom and rules for equality,
• the axiom and rules for successor, addition and multiplication,
• any one of the axioms and rules for induction or complete induction.
2.1.6 Axioms for the Law of the Excluded Middle
In this subsection we introduce a hierarchy of axiom schemes that are restrictions of the law
of the excluded middle, taken from [1]. We refer to the same work for explanations and
proofs of our claims in this subsection.
We define a purely syntactical version of the usual classification for formulas in prenex
normal form in arithmetic.
Definition 2 (Syntactical Arithmetical Hierarchy). We define the following classes of formu-
las by induction on n:
• Π00 and Σ00 are the set of the quantifier free formulas,
• Π0n+1 is the set of the formulas ∀x. A where A ∈ Σ0n,
• Σ0n+1 is the set of the formulas ∀x. A where A ∈ Π0n.
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We do not require closure for logical equivalence and thus the definition of Π0n and Σ
0
n
is purely syntactical. Since the negation of a formula in prenex normal form is not in
prenex normal form we define the following negative conversion, which we call the dual of
a formula:
A¬ ≡

∃x. B¬ if A = ∀x. B ∈ Π0n,
∀x. B¬ if A = ∃x. B ∈ Σ0n,
¬A if A ∈ Π00.
Note that if A is a Π0n (resp. Σ
0
n) formula then A
¬ is a Σ0n (resp. Π0n) formula. Moreover A¬ is
classically equivalent to ¬A and intuitionistically stronger than ¬A, except when A is a Π00
formula, in which case it is equivalent to ¬A.
The law of the excluded middle says that any statement is either true or false. More
precisely, it says that either a statement is true or its negation is true. This is intuitionistically
equivalent to the fact that either a statement is true or its dual is true. We define a sequence
of restricted forms of this law.
Definition 3 (Restricted Excluded Middle Axiom Schemas). For any n ∈ Nat, we define the
limited law of the excluded middle EMn as the axiom schema:
A¬ ∨ A, (EMn)
where A is a Σ0n formula. As a limit case we define EM∞ where A is a Π0n formula for any n.
By adding EM∞ to intuitionistic logic we get classical logic, so by adding EM∞ to Heyt-
ing Arithmetic we get Peano Arithmetic, the theory of classical arithmetic. We can also
produce many intermediate logics by adding EMn to Heyting Arithmetic, which we write as
HA + EMn. Note that EM0 is true in Heyting Arithmetic, so HA + EM0 is simply HA.
2.2 A Simply Typed λ-Calculus for Realizability
In this section we introduce system T ′, a simply typed λ-calculus variant of Go¨del’s system T
in which we shall write our realizers. System T ′ will be more convenient for our purposes in
order to get a more straightforward translation of monads and related concepts from category
2.2. A Simply Typed λ-Calculus for Realizability 13
theory. There are two main differences between our system T ′ and system T . The first
one is that we replace the boolean type with the more general sum (or co-product) type.
The second one is that the recursion operator uses complete recursion instead of standard
primitive recursion.
We begin by defining the types. We shall use the metavariables X,Y and Z for types. We
assume that we have a finite set of atomic types that includes the unit type Unit and the type
of natural numbers Nat. Moreover we have three type binary type constructors→,×,+. In
other words, for any types X and Y we have the arrow (or function) type X → Y , the product
type X × Y and the sum (or co-product) type X + Y .
We can now define the typed terms of the calculus. We assume that we have a countable
set of typed term constants that includes the constructors and the destructors for the unit,
natural, product and sum types (listed in Figure 2.6) and a countable set of variables of type
X for any type X:
x0 : X, . . . , xn : X, . . . .
We use the metavariables x, y, z for terms. Moreover for any two terms x : X and y : X → Y
we have a term yx : Y and for any variable x : X and term y : Y we have a term λx. y : X → Y .
In order to avoid a parenthesis overflow, we shall follow the usual conventions for writing
terms and types. For terms this means that application and abstraction are respectively left
and right-associative and that abstraction binds as many terms as possible on its right; for
types it means that × and + are left-associative and associate more closely than→, which is
right-associative. We also omit outer parenthesis. For example:
X → Y → X × Y × Z stands for (X → (Y → ((X × Y) × Z))),
λxX .λyY .λzZ .t1t2t3 stands for (λxX .(λyY .(λzZ .((t1t2)t3)))).
We define some reduction relations, that is, binary relations between terms:
(λxX .t)a→β t[x B a],
prX,YL (pair
X,Y ab)→× a, caseX,Y,Z(inX,YL a) f g→+ f a,
prX,YR (pair
X,Y ab)→× b, caseX,Y,Z(inX,YR b) f g→+ gb,
crecZn hm→R
hm(crec
Z
m h) if m < n or n = ∞,
dummyZ otherwise,
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Figure 2.6: Constructors and destructors
∗ : Unit,
pairX,Y : X → Y → X × Y,
prX,YL : X × Y → X, prX,YR : X × Y → Y,
inX,YL : X → X + Y, inX,YR : Y → X + Y,
caseX,Y,Z : X + Y → (X → Z)→ (Y → Z)→ Z,
zero : Nat, succ : Nat→ Nat,
crecZn : (Nat→ (Nat→ Z)→ Z)→ Nat→ Z.
where n is a natural number or the symbol∞. In order we have the constant constructor of type Unit,
the constructor and the two destructors of the product types, the two constructors and the destructor
of the sum types and the two constructors and the destructor of the natural type. Most of those are
actually “parametric polymorphic” terms, that is, families of constants indexed by the types X,Y and
Z.
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where a : X, b : Y , c : Z, f : X → Z, g : Y → Z and h : Nat → (Nat → Z) → Z. Note that
we use c as a dummy term of type Z1. Then we set the reduction relation→ to be the union
of→β,→×,→+ and→R. Also let { be the transitive and reflexive closure of→.
We explain the reduction given for crec, since it is not the standard one. The difference is
due to the fact that crec is meant to realize complete induction instead of standard induction.
In complete induction, the inductive hypothesis holds not only for the immediate predecessor
of the value we are considering, but also for all the smaller values.
Similarly, crec allows us to recursively define a function f where the value of f (m) de-
pends not only on the value of f (m − 1) but also on the value of f (l), for any l < m. Thus,
when computing crecZn hm, instead of taking the value of crecZn h(m − 1) as an argument, h
takes the whole function crecZn h. In order to avoid unbounded recursion, we add a guard
n that prevents crecZn h to be computed on arguments greater or equal to n. More precisely
crecZn hm only reduces to hm(crecZm h) if m < n; thus, even if h requires crecZm h to be com-
puted on many values, the height of the computation trees is bound by m2. Naturally, a
“good” h should not evaluate crecZm h on values bigger than m, but in any case the guard
guarantees termination. The symbol∞ acts as a dummy guard, which gets replaced with an
effective one when crecZ∞ h is evaluated the first time.
We shall also need the following equivalence relations between terms:
λxX .t =α λyX .t[x B y], (α-conversion)
λxX .tx =η t, (η-conversion)
pairX,Y (prX,YL c)(pr
X,Y
R c) =× c, (×-conversion)
caseX,Y,X+Y d inX,YL in
X,Y
R =+ d, (+-conversion)
for all terms t, c : X × Y and d : X + Y . Again we set the equivalence = to be the union of
=α,=η,=× and =+.
1 As long as the base types are inhabited, we can define an arbitrary dummy term dummyX for any type X:
dummyUnit ≡ ∗, dummyNat ≡ 0,
dummyX→Y ≡ λ X .dummyY , dummyX×Y ≡ pair dummyX dummyY , dummyX+Y ≡ inL dummyX .
2Unlike in standard primitive recursion, where the computation always comprises m steps, in course-of-
values primitive recursion the computation can actually be shorter if h “skips” values.
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It is easy to see that the boolean type and the related terms true, false and ite in system T
can be defined in system T ′. The reverse is also true, that is, we can define sum types and
terms inL, inR and case in system T . We show how to interpret the boolean type and related
constants of system T in our system.
Bool ≡ Unit + Unit,
true ≡ inL ∗ false ≡ inR ∗,
iteX ≡ λbBool.λxX .λxX . case b(λ Unit.x)(λ Unit.x).
We assume that X and Y are inhabited, that is, that there exist terms x0 : X and y0 : Y . Then
we can interpret the sum type and related constants in system T :
X + Y ≡ Bool × (X × Y),
inX,YL ≡ λxX . pair true(pair xy0),
inX,YR ≡ λyY . pair false(pair x0y),
caseX,Y,Z ≡ λbBool×(X×Y).λ f X→Z .λgY→Z . ite(prL b)( f (prL(prR b)))(g(prR(prR b))).
System T ′ shares most of the good properties of Go¨del’s system T , in particular conflu-
ence, strong normalization3 and a normal form property.
3Strong normalization is a consequence of the explicit bound on recursion given by the subscript in the
recursion constant.
Chapter 3
A Monadic Framework for
Interactive Realizability
In this chapter we give a new presentation of interactive realizability with a more explicit
syntax.
Monads can be used to structure functional programs by providing a clean and modu-
lar way to include impure features in purely functional languages. We express interactive
realizers by means of an abstract framework that applies the monadic approach used in func-
tional programming to modified realizability, in order to obtain more “relaxed” realizability
notions that are suitable to classical logic. In particular we use a combination of the state
and exception monads in order to capture the learning-from-mistakes nature of interactive
realizers at the syntactic level.
3.1 Introduction
As we have already remarked in the preface, the Curry-Howard correspondence was origi-
nally discovered for intuitionistic proofs. This is not coincidental: the type systems needed
to interpret intuitionistic proofs are usually very simple and natural, as in the case of Heyt-
ing Arithmetic and System T (see [10]). While classical proofs can be transformed into in-
tuitionistic ones by means of the double-negation translation and then translated into typed
programs, the existence of a direct correspondence was deemed unlikely until Griffin showed
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otherwise in [12].
Starting with Griffin’s, other interpretations extending the Curry-Howard correspon-
dence to classical logic have been put forward. Griffin uses a “typed Idealized Scheme”
with the control construct call/cc, that allows access to the current continuation. In [19],
Parigot introduces the λµ-calculus, an extension of lambda calculus with an additional kind
of variables for subterms. In [16], Krivine uses lambda calculus with a non-standard seman-
tics, described by an abstract machine that allows the manipulation of “stacks”, which can
be thought of as execution contexts.
All these different approaches seems to suggest that, in order to interpret classical logic,
we need control operators or some syntactical equivalent thereof. This could be generalized
in the idea that “impure” computational constructs are needed in order to interpret non-
constructive proofs. Monads are a concept from category theory that has been widely used
in computer science. In particular, they can be used to structure functional programs that
mimic the effects of impure features.
In [18], Moggi advocates the use of monads as a framework to describe and study many
different “notions of computation” in the context of categorical semantics of programming
languages. A different take on the same idea that actually eschews category theory com-
pletely is suggested in [26] by Wadler: the definition of monad becomes purely syntactic
and is used as a framework to structure functional programs by providing a clean and modu-
lar way to include impure features in purely functional languages (one noteworthy example
is I/O in Haskell).
The main idea of this work is to use monads as suggested by Wadler in order to structure
programs extracted from classical proofs by interactive realizability. A program extracted
by means interactive realizability, called interactive realizer, can be thought of as a learning
process. It accumulate information in a knowledge state and use this knowledge in order
to “decide” the instances of EM1 used in the proof. Since these instances are in general
undecidable, the realizer actually makes an “educated guess” about which side of an EM1
instance is true by looking at the state. Such guesses can be wrong.
This can become apparent later in the proof, when the guessed side of the EM1 instance
is used to deduce some decidable statement. If this decidable statement turns out to be false,
then the guess was wrong and the proof cannot be completed. In this case the realizer cannot
produce the evidence required for the final statement and fails. However failure is due to the
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fact that we made a wrong guess. We can add this information to the state, so that, using
this new state, we will be able to guess the EM1 instance correctly. At this point we discard
the computation that occurred after the wrong guess and we resume from there. This time
we guess correctly and can proceed until the end or until we fail again because we guessed
incorrectly another EM1 instance.
There are three “impure” parts in the behavior we described: the dependency on the
knowledge state, the possibility of failure to produce the intended result and the backtracking
after the failure. In this work we use a monadic approach to describe the first two parts which
are peculiar to interactive realizability. We do not describe the third part, which is common
also to the other interpretations of classical logic.
This chapter is an account of interactive realizability where interactive realizers are en-
coded as λ-terms following the monadic approach to structuring functional programms sug-
gested by Wadler. We shall prove that our presentation of interactive realizability is a sound
semantics for HA + EM1.
3.1.1 Main Results
In our presentation, interactive realizer are written in a simply typed λ-calculus with prod-
ucts, coproducts and natural numbers with course-of-value recursion, extended with some
abstract terms to represent states and exceptions. The peculiar features of interactive real-
izability, namely the dependency on the knowledge state and the possibility of failure, are
explicitly computed by the λ-terms encoding the realizers. Thus the computational behavior
of interactive realizers is evident at the syntactic level, without the need for special seman-
tics.
While proving the soundness of HA + EM1 with respect to our definition of interactive
realizability, we observed that the soundness of HA did not require any assumption on the
specific monad we chose to structure interactive realizers (while the soundness of EM1 re-
quires them as expected). Prompted by this discovery, we split the presentation in two parts.
The former is an abstract monadic framework for producing realizability notions where
the realizers are written in monadic style. We prove that HA is sound with respect to any
realizability semantics defined by the framework, for any monad.
The latter is an application of this abstract framework to interactive realizability. We
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define a specific monad which we use to structure interactive realizers and a class of realiz-
ability semantics that
our definition of interactive realizability can be generalized to an abstract realizability
notion where the monad is a parameter. We call this family of realizability notions monadic
realizability and we show that all instances of monadic realizability are sound semantics
for HA. Our interest is in concrete monadic realizability notions that can realize classical
principles beyond HA. Another motivation is that in the proof of the soundness of HA+EM1
with respect to interactive realizability semantics, we take advantage of the special properties
of the interactive realizability monad just to prove the soundness EM1, while for the rest of
HA we just need some generic properties on the semantics which require no assumption on
the monad we are considering.
3.1.2 Related Works
This work builds on the presentation of interactive realizability given in [2] by Aschieri and
Berardi. The main contributions with respect to [2] is a more precise description of the
computational behavior of interactive realizer. This is explained in more detail at the end of
this chaper.
Monads have first been used to describe interactive realizability by Berardi and de’Liguoro
in [7] and [4], where interactive realizers for PRA+EM1 are given a monadic categorical se-
mantics following Moggi’s approach. While our idea of using monad to describe interactive
realizability was inspired by [7], our work is mostly unrelated: our use of monads follows
Wadler’s syntactical approach and we employ a different monad that emphasizes different
aspects of interactive realizability.
3.2 Monadic Realizability
This section contains the abstract part of our work. We describe the abstract framework of
monadic realizability and show the soundness of HA with respect to the semantics induced
by a generic monad.
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3.2.1 The Monadic Realizability Semantics
In this subsection we define monadic realizability. We state the properties that a suitable
relation must satisfy in order to be called a monadic realizability relation and we show how
such a relation induces a (monadic) realizability semantics. Then we describe the proof
decoration procedure to extract monadic realizers from proofs in HA. Here we are only
concerned with proofs in HA, for a non-trivial example of a monadic realizability notion see
interactive realizability in Section 3.3.
We start by introducing a syntactic translation of the concept of monad from category
theory. Informally, a monad is an operator TM “extending” a type, with a canonical embed-
ding from X to TM(X), a canonical way to lift a map from X to TM(Y) to a map from TM(X)
to TM(Y), a canonical way of merging an element of TM(X) and an element of TM(Y) into
an element of TM(X × Y). We also requires some equations relating these canonical maps,
equations which are often satisfied in the practice of programming.
Definition 4 (Syntactic Monad). A syntactic monad M is a tuple (TM, unitM, starM, mergeM)
where TM is a type constructor, that is, a map from types to types, and, for any types X,Y,
unitM, starM and mergeM are families (indexed by X and Y) of closed terms:
unitXM : X → TMX,
starX,Y
M
: (X → TMY)→ (TMX → TMY),
mergeX,Y
M
: TMX → TMY → TM(X × Y),
satisfying the following properties:
starX,X
M
unitXM x{ x, (M1)
starX,Y
M
f (unitXM x) { f x, (M2)
mergeX,Y
M
(unitXM x)(unit
X
M y) { unit
X×Y
M (pair
X,Y xy), (M3)
for any x : TMX, f : X → TMY, g : Y → TMZ, x : X and x : Y.
The terms unitM and starM and Properties M1 and M2 are a straightforward translation
of the definition of Kleisli tripe in category theory, an equivalent way to describe a monad1.
1 This part of the definition follows the one given by Wadler in [26], with the difference that we replace the
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Term mergeM and Property M3 are connected to the definition of strong monad: mergeM
is the syntactical counterpart of the natural transformation φ, induced by the tensorial strength
of the monad (see [18] for details). While φ satisfies several other properties in [18], Prop-
erty M3 is the only one we need for our treatment.
Example 1. The simplest example of syntactic monad is the identity monad Id, defined as:
TIdX ≡ X, unitXId ≡ λxX .x,
starX,Y
Id ≡ λ f X→Y . f , mergeX,YId ≡ pairX,Y .
This monad cannot describe any additional computational property besides the value a term
reduces to.
Example 2. A simple but non-trivial example is the exception monad Ex. It describes com-
putations which may either succeed and yield a (normal) value or fail and yield a description
of the failure. Consider the usual predecessor function pred : Nat→ Nat on the natural num-
bers: since zero has no predecessor it is common to define pred 0 as zero. Instead with Ex
we could have pred 0 fail and yield a string2 saying “zero has no predecessor”.
Let Ex be a new ground type and let merge : Ex → Ex → Ex be a new constant term.
We think terms of type Ex as descriptions of failures and we call them exceptions. We think
of merge as an operation that merges the information of multiple exceptions when there are
term bind with starM, where:
bindX,Y : TMX → (X → TMY)→ TMY.
Defining starM and bind in terms of each other is straightforward:
bindX,Y ≡ λxTMX .λ f X→TMY . starM f x,
starX,Y
M
≡ λ f X→TMY .λxTMX . bind x f .
The term starM corresponds directly to the operator ∗ in the definition of Kleisli triple.
2assuming we had strings in our calculus
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multiple failures in a computations. Now we can define the syntactic monad Ex as:
TExX ≡ X + Ex, unitXEx ≡ λxX . inX,ExL x,
starX,Y
Ex ≡ λ f X→Y+Ex.λxX . caseX,Ex,Y+Ex x f inY,ExR ,
mergeX,Y
Ex ≡ λxX+Ex.λyY+Ex. caseX,Ex,(X×Y)+Ex x
(λxX . caseY,Ex,(X×Y)+Ex y(λyY . inX×Y,ExL (pair
X,Y xy)) inX×Y,ExR )
(λeEx1 . case
Y,Ex,(X×Y)+Ex y(λyY . inX×Y,ExR e1)(λe
Ex
2 . in
X×Y,Ex
R merge e1e2)).
We omit the proof that Ex is a syntactic monad.
A realizability relation is a binary relation between terms and closed formulas. When
a term and a formula are in such a relation we shall say that the term realizes the formula
or that the term is a realizer of the formula. The intended meaning is that a realizer of a
formula is the computational content of a proof of the formula.
We proceed towards the definition of a family of realizability relations, which we call
monadic realizability relations. Any monadic realizability relation is given with respect to
some monad M and determines a particular notion of realizability where realizers have the
computational properties described by the monad. In the rest of this section we shall assume
that M = (TM, unitM, starM,mergeM) denotes any fixed syntactic monad.
We now define the type of the monadic realizers of a formula. The idea is to take the
standard definition of the type of intuitionistic realizers of a formula A and to apply TM only
to the type X of the whole formula A and to the types appearing in X after an arrow, namely
the types of consequents C of implication sub-formulas B→ C in A and the types of bodies
B of universal quantified sub-formulas ∀x. B in A. This is the standard call-by-value way to
treat arrow types in a monadic framework explained in [25].
Definition 5 (Types for Monadic Realizers). We define two mappings ‖·‖M and |·|M from
formulas to types by simultaneous recursion. The first is the outer or monadic typing of a
formula A:
‖A‖M = TM|A|M,
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and the latter is the inner typing, defined by induction on the structure of A:
|P|M = Unit, |B ∧C|M = |B|M × |C|M,
|B ∨C|M = |B|M + |C|M, |∃x. B|M = Nat × |B|M,
|B→ C|M = |B|M → ‖C‖M, |∀x. B|M = Nat→ ‖B‖M,
where P is an atomic formula and A and B are any formulas.
Note that, we consider ⊥ to be atomic and ¬A to be a notation for A → ⊥, so the types
of their realizers follow from the previous definition.
As we defined two types for each formula A, each formula has two possible realizers,
one of type |A|M and one of type ‖A‖M. The former will follow the BHK interpretation
like an ordinary intuitionistic realizer while the latter will be able to take advantage of the
computational properties given by the syntactic monad M. A formula (in particular classical
principles) may have a realizer of monadic type but no realizer of inner type.
Remark 1. The definition of ‖·‖M and |·|M can be derived from the Curry-Howard corre-
spondence between formulas and types and from a call-by-name monadic translation for
types. We define the standard interpretation |·| that maps a formula into the type of its
realizers:
|P| = Unit, |A ∧ B| = |A| × |B|,
|A ∨ B| = |A| + |B|, |A→ B| = |A| → |B|,
|∀x. A| = Nat→ |A|, |∃x. A| = Nat × |A|.
Next we define a translation ~·M that lifts types to their monadic counterparts:
~X0M ≡ X0, ~X → YM ≡ ~XM → TM~YM,
~X × YM ≡ ~XM × ~YM, ~X + YM ≡ ~XM + ~YM,
where X0 is a ground type. The first two clauses are taken from [27] and the other ones are
a simple extension, based on the idea that products and sums behave like ground types.
By composition we can define the types for the monadic realizers of a formula:
|A|M ≡ ~|A|M, ‖A‖M ≡ TM|A|M.
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Expanding the definitions we get :
|P|M = Unit,
|A ∧ B|M = ~|A|M × ~|B|M = |A|M × |B|M,
|A ∨ B|M = ~|A|M + ~|B|M = |A|M + |B|M,
|A→ B|M = ~|A|M → TM~|B|M = |A|M → TM|B|M,
|∀x. A|M = ~NatM → TM~|B|M = Nat→ TM|A|M,
|∃x. A|M = ~NatM × ~|B|M = Nat × |A|M.
This is the same translation we described in Definition 5.
We shall now state the requirements for a realizability relation to be a monadic realizabil-
ity relation. A realizability relation is to be thought of as the restriction of the realizability
semantics to closed formulas, that is, a relation between terms of T ′ and closed formulas
which holds when a term is a realizer of the formula. Since a formula can have realizers of
inner and outer type, in the following definition two realizability relations will appear: RM
for realizers of inner type, whose definition is modeled after the BHK interpretation and RM
for the realizers of outer type, which takes in consideration the computational properties of
the monad M.
As a typographical convention we shall use the letters r, p and q for terms of type |A|M.
Similarly we shall use r, p and q for terms of type ‖A‖M.
Definition 6 (Monadic Realizability Relation). Let RM be a realizability relation between
terms of type ‖A‖M and closed formulas A. Let RM be another realizability relation between
terms of type |A|M and closed formulas A, such that
• r RM P iff r { ∗ and P is true,
• r RM B ∧C iff prL r RM B and prR r RM C,
• r RM B ∨C iff r { inL a and a RM B or r { inR b and b RM C,
• r RM B→ C iff rp RM C for all p : |B|M such that p RM B,
• r RM ∀x. B iff rn RM B[x B n] for all natural numbers n,
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• r RM ∃x. B iff prR r RM B[x B prL r],
where P is a closed atomic formula and B and C are generic formulas. We consider ⊥ a
closed atomic formula which is never true (for instance 0 = 1). We shall say that the pair
(RM, RM) is a monadic realizability relation if the following properties are satisfied:
MR1 if r RM A then unitM r RM A,
MR2 if r RM B→ C then starM rp RM C for all p : ‖B‖M such that p RM B,
MR3 if p RM B and q RM C then mergeM pq RM B ∧C.
We will say that a term r (resp. r) is an inner (resp. outer or monadic) realizer of a formula
A if r : |A|M (resp. r : ‖A‖M) and r RM A (resp. r RM A).
When defining a concrete monadic realizability relation, it is often convenient to define
RM in terms of RM too, that is, the two relations will be defined by simultaneous recursion
in terms of each other.
Note how the properties of the relation RM resemble the clauses the definition of standard
modified realizability. The main difference is that in the functional cases, those of implica-
tion and universal quantification, RM is not defined in terms of itself but uses RM. This
makes apparent our claim that the behavior of inner realizers is closely related to the BHK
interpretation.
Property MR1 is a constraint on the relationship between RM and RM. It requires unitM
to transform inner realizers into monadic realizers, which can be thought as the fact that
realizers satisfying the BHK interpretation are acceptable monadic realizers. Property MR2
again links RM and RM, this time through starM. It says that, if we have a term that maps
inner realizers into monadic realizers, its lifting by means of starM maps monadic realizers
into monadic realizers. Property MR3 is a compatibility condition between mergeM and
RM. These conditions are all we shall need in order to show that any monadic realizability
relation determines a sound semantics for HA. Later we shall see how particular instances
of monadic realizability can produce a sound semantics for more than just HA.
Example 3. We continue our example with the identity monad Id by defining a monadic
realizability relation. We define RId and RId by simultaneous recursion, with RId defined in
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terms of RId as in Definition 6 and RId defined as RId, which makes sense since ‖A‖Id =
|A|Id.
We can now define the monadic realizability semantics for a given monadic realizability
relation, that is, we say when a realizer validates a sequent where a formula can be open and
depend on assumptions. In order to do this we need a notation for a formula in a context,
which we call decorated sequent. A decorated sequent has the form Γ M r : A where A is a
formula, r is a term of type ‖A‖M and Γ is the context, namely, a list of assumptions written
as α1 : A1, . . . αk : Ak where A1, . . . , Ak are formulas and α1, . . . , αk are proof variables that
label each assumption, that is, they are variables of type |A1|M, . . . , |Ak|M. As we did with
the syntactic monad M, in the following we shall assume to be working with a fixed generic
monadic realizability relation RM.
Definition 7 (Monadic Realizability Semantics). Consider a decorated sequent:
α1 : A1, . . . , αk : Ak M r : B,
such that the free variables of B are x1, . . . , xl and the free variables of r are either in
x1, . . . , xl or in α1, . . . , αk. We say that the sequent is valid if and only if for all natural
numbers n1, . . . , nl and for all inner realizers p1 : |A1|M, . . . , pk : |Ak|M such that
p1 RM A1[x1 B n1, . . . , xl B nl] . . . pk RM Ak[x1 B n1, . . . , xl B nl],
we have that
r[x1 B n1, . . . , xl B nl, α1 B p1, . . . , αk B pk] RM A[x1 B n1, . . . , xl B nl].
Example 4. From Definition 7, it follows that the semantics induced by the monadic realiz-
ability relation RId is exactly the standard semantics of modified realizability.
Now that we have defined our semantics, we can illustrate the method to extract monadic
realizers from proofs in HA. Later we shall show how to extend our proof extraction tech-
nique to HA+EM1. Since proof in HA are constructive, the monadic realizers obtained from
them behave much like their counterparts in standard modified realizability and comply with
the BHK interpretation. In Section 3.3 we shall show how to extend the proof decoration to
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non constructive proofs by exhibiting a monadic realizer of EM1 that truly takes advantage
of monadic realizability since it does not act accordingly to the BHK interpretation.
In order to build monadic realizers of proofs in HA we need a generalization of starM
that works for functions of more than one argument. We can build it using mergeM to pack
realizers together. Thus let
star
X1,...,Xk ,Y
k : (X1 → · · · → Xk → TMY)→ (TMX1 → · · · → TMXk → TMY),
be a family of terms defined by induction on k ≥ 0:
starY0 ≡ λ f TMY . f , starX,Y1 ≡ starX,YM ,
stark+2 ≡ λ f X1→···→Xk+2→TMY .λxTMX1 .λyTMX2 . stark+1(λzX1×X2 . f (prL z)(prR z))(mergeM xy).
For instance:
star2 ≡ λ f X→Y→TMZ .λxTMX .λyTMY . starM(λzX×Y . f (prL z)(prR z))(mergeM xy)
Moreover we shall need to “raise” the return value of a term f : X1 → · · · → Xk → Y
with unitM before we apply stark. We define the family of terms raisek by means of stark,
for any k ≥ 0:
raisek : (X1 → · · · → Xk → Y)→ (TMX1 → · · · → TMXk → TMY)
raisek ≡ λ f X1→···→Xk→Z . stark(λxX11 . · · · λxXkk . unitM( f x1 · · · xk)),
Now we can show how to extract a monadic realizer from a proof in HA. Let D be a
derivation of some formula A in HA, that is, a derivation ending with Γ ` A. We produce a
decorated derivation by replacing each rule instance in D with the suitable instance of the
decorated version of the same rule given in Figure 3.1. These decorated rules differ from
the previous version in that they replace sequents with decorated sequents, that is, they bind
a term to each formula, where the term bound to the conclusion of a rule is build from the
terms bound to the premises. Thus we have defined a term by structural induction on the
derivation: if the conclusion of the decorated derivation is Γ M r : A then we setD∗ ≡ r.
In Figure 3.1, the rule labeled Atm shows how to decorate any atomic rule of HA. By
definition unfolding, we may check that an atomic rule is interpreted as a kind of “merging”
of the information associated to each premise. The nature of the merging depends on the
monad we choose.
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Figure 3.1: HA rules, decorated with monadic realizers.
Id
Γ M raise0 x : A
Γ M r1 : P1 . . . Γ M rl : PlAtm
Γ M raisel(λγUnit1 . · · · λγUnitl . ∗)r1 · · · rl : P
Γ M r1 : A Γ M r2 : B∧I
Γ M raise2 pair r1r2 : A ∧ B
Γ M r : A ∧ B∧EL
Γ M raise1 prL r : A
Γ M r : A ∧ B∧ER
Γ M raise1 prR r : B
Γ M r1 : A∨IR
Γ M raise1 inL r1 : A ∨ B
Γ M r2 : B∨IL
Γ M raise1 inR r2 : A ∨ B
Γ M r : A ∨ B Γ, αk+1 : A M p : C Γ, αk+1 : B M q : C∨E
Γ M star1(λγ|A|M+|B|M . case γ(λα|A|Mk+1 .p)(λα
|B|M
k+1 .q))r : C
Γ, αk+1 : A M r : B→ I
Γ M raise0(λα
|A|M
k+1 .r) : A→ B
Γ M r : A→ B Γ M p : A→ E
Γ M star2(λγ
|A|M→|B|M
1 .λγ
|A|M
2 .γ1γ2)rp : B
Γ M r : A∀I
Γ M raise0(λxNat.r) : ∀x. A
Γ M r : ∀x. A∀E
Γ M (star1(λγNat→‖A‖M .γt))r : A[x B t]
Γ M r : A[x B t]∃I
Γ M raise1(λγ|A|M . pair tγ)r : ∃x. A
Γ M r1 : ∃x. A Γ, α : A[x B y] M r2 : C∃E
Γ M star1(λγNat×|A|M .(λyNat.λα|A|M .r2)(prL γ)(prR γ))r1 : C
Γ, αk+1 : ∀z. z < y→ A[x B z] M r : A[x B y]Ind
Γ M raise0(crec∞ f ) : ∀x. A
where all formulas in rule Atm are atomic, t is any term and f is defined as follows:
f ≡ λyNat.λβNat→TM |A|M .(λαNat→TM(Unit→TM |A|M).r)(λzNat. raise0(λ Unit.βz)),
with β not free in r.
Remark 2. In Figure 3.1, we wrote all realizers using only raisek and stark for the sake of
consistency, but note that raise0 could have been replaced by unitM since it reduces to it:
raise0 ≡raise0 λ f Z . star0(unitM f )
≡star0 λ f Z .(λ f TMZ . f )(unitM f )
→β λ f Z . unitM f
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=η unitM
Moreover raise2 pair reduces to mergeM:
raise2 pair ≡raise2 (λ f X→Y→X×Y . star2(λxX .λyY . unitM( f xy))) pair
{β star2(λxX .λyY . unitM(pair xy))
≡star2 (λ f X→Y→TM(X×Y).λxTMX .λyTMY .
stark(λzX×Y . f (prL z)(prR z))(mergeM xy))(λxX .λyY . unitM pair xy)
{β λxTMX .λyTMY . starM(λzX×Y .(λxX .λyY . unitM pair xy)(prL z)(prR z))(mergeM xy)
{β λxTMX .λyTMY . starM(λzX×Y . unitM pair prL zprR z)(mergeM xy)
=× λxTMX .λyTMY . starM(λzX×Y . unitM z)(mergeM xy)
=η λxTMX .λyTMY . starM unitM(mergeM xy)
{M2 λxTMX .λyTMY .mergeM xy
=η mergeM,
so we could replace it in ∧I.
Note how the monadic realizer of each rule is obtained by lifting the suitable term in
the corresponding standard modified realizer with stark or raisek. These monadic realizers
do not take advantages of particular monadic features (it cannot be otherwise since we have
made no assumption on the syntactic monad or the monadic realizability relation). The main
difference is that they can act as “glue” between “true” monadic realizers of non constructive
axioms and rules, for instance the one we shall build in Section 3.3.
Here we can see that monadic realizability generalizes intuitionistic realizability: dec-
orated rules in Figure 3.1 reduce to the standard decorated rules for intuitionistic modified
realizability in the case of the identity monad Id.
3.2.2 The Soundness Theorem
In this subsection we prove that HA is sound with respect to the monadic realizability seman-
tics given in Definition 7. This amounts to say that we can use proof decoration to extract,
from any proof in HA, a monadic realizer that makes its conclusion valid. We prove this for a
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generic monad, which means that the soundness of HA does not depend on the special prop-
erties of any specific monad. The proof only needs the simple properties we have requested
in Definition 6.
Before proving the main result, we need to show that stark and raisek satisfy a general-
ization of Property MR2.
Proposition 1 (Monadic Realizability Property for stark). Let A1, . . . , Ak and B be any for-
mulas and let r : |A1|M → · · · → |Ak|M → ‖B‖M be a term. Assume that, for all terms
p1 : |A1|M, . . . , pk : |Ak|M such that p1 RM A1, . . . , pk RM Ak, we have:
rp1 · · · pk RM B.
Then, for all terms p1 : ‖A1‖M, . . . , pk : ‖Ak‖M such that p1 RM A1, . . . , pk RM Ak, we have:
stark rp1 · · · pk RM B.
Proof. By induction on k. For k = 0 it is trivial and for k = 1 it follows from Property MR2
since star1 ≡ starM. Now we just need to prove that if the statement holds for some k ≥ 1, it
holds for k + 1 too.
As in the statement we assume that, for all terms p1 : |A1|M, . . . , pk+1 : |Ak+1|M such that
p1 RM A1, . . . , pk+1 RM Ak+1:
rp1 · · · pk+1 RM B,
and that p1 : ‖A1‖M, . . . , pk+1 : ‖Ak+1‖M are terms such that p1 RM A1, . . . , pk+1 RM Ak+1.
We need to show that:
stark+1 rp1 · · · pk+1 RM B.
Since we know by definition of stark+1 that stark+1 rp1 · · · pk+1 reduces to the term:
stark(λz|A1 |M×|A2 |M .r(prL z)(prR z))(mergeM p1p2)p3 · · · pk+1,
and by Property MR3 that mergeM p1p2 RM A1 ∧ A2, we see that we can use the inductive
hypothesis on k to conclude. In order to do so we have to show that the assumption of the
inductive hypothesis holds, namely that, for any p1 : |A1|M×|A2|M, p3 : |A3|M, . . . , pk : |Ak|M
such that p1 RM A1 ∧ A2, p2 RM A2, . . . , pk RM Ak it is the case that:
(λz|A1 |M×|A2 |M .r(prL z)(prR z))p1 · · · pk RM B.
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By reducing the realizer we get that this is equivalent to:
r(prL p1)(prR p1)p2 · · · pk RM B,
which is true by the assumption on r since p1 RM A1 ∧ A2 means that prL p1 RM A1 and
prR p1 RM A2 by definition of RM. 
We prove a similar property for raisek.
Proposition 2 (Monadic Realizability Property for raisek). Let A1, . . . , Ak and B be any
formulas and let r : |A1|M → · · · → |Ak|M → |B|M be a term. Assume that, for all terms
p1 : |A1|M, . . . , pk : |Ak|M such that p1 RM A1, . . . , pk RM Ak, it is the case that:
rp1 · · · pk RM B.
Then, for all terms p1 : ‖A1‖M, . . . , pk : ‖Ak‖M such that p1 RM A1, . . . , pk RM Ak, we have
that:
raisek rp1 · · · pk RM B.
Proof. Assume that, for all terms p1 : |A1|M, . . . , pk : |Ak|M such that p1 RM A1, . . . , pk RM
Ak, it is the case that:
rp1 · · · pk RM B,
and let p1 : ‖A1‖M, . . . , pk : ‖Ak‖M be terms such that p1 RM A1, . . . , pk RM Ak. We want to
prove that:
raisek rp1 · · · pk RM B.
By definition of raisek this reduces to:
stark(λx
|A1 |M
1 . · · · λx|Ak |Mk . unitM(rx1 · · · xk))p1 · · · pk RM B.
This follows by Proposition 1 if we can show that, for any p1 : |A1|M, . . . , pk : |Ak|M such
that p1 RM A1, . . . , pk RM Ak, we have:
(λx|A1 |M1 . · · · λx|Ak |Mk . unitM(rx1 · · · xk))p1 · · · pk RM B.
Reducing the realizer we get that this is equivalent to:
unitM(rp1 · · · pk) RM B,
and this follows by Property MR1 and by assumption on r. 
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Now we are ready to prove the soundness theorem.
Theorem 1 (Soundness of HA with respect to the Monadic Realizability Semantics). LetD
be a derivation of Γ ` A in HA and RM a monadic realizability relation. Then Γ M D∗ : A
is valid with respect to RM.
The proof is long but simple, proceeding by induction on the structure of the decorated
version ofD.
Proof. We proceed by induction on the structure of the decorated version of D, that is, we
assume that the statement holds for all decorated sub-derivations of D and we prove that it
holds for D too. More precisely we have to check the soundness of each decorated rule,
showing that the validity of the premises yields the validity of the conclusion.
We start with some general notation and observations. Let Γ ≡ α1 : A1, . . . , αk : Ak for
some k. Following the notation in Definition 7, we fix natural numbers n1, . . . , nl and terms
r1 : A1, . . . , rk : Ak, we define abbreviations:
Ω ≡ x1 B n1, . . . , xl B nl,
Σ ≡ α1 B r1, . . . , αk B rk,
and we assume that:
r1 RM A1[Ω] . . . rk RM Ak[Ω].
Note that if some term t : X1 → · · · → Xk → Y has no free variables then (ta1 · · · ak)[Ω,Σ] ≡
t(a1[Ω,Σ]) · · · (ak[Ω,Σ]). In particular this holds if t is one of stark, raisek, pair, prL, prR, case,
inL, inR. The same holds for formulas, so (A ? B)[Ω] ≡ A[Ω] ? B[Ω] where ? is one of ∧,∨
or→. Also note that |A[Ω]|M = |A|M since |·|M does not depend on the terms in A. In partic-
ular the types of the proof variables in Γ do not change, meaning we do not need to perform
substitutions in Γ. We shall take advantage of these facts without mentioning it.
Now we can start showing that the rules are sound.
Id We have to prove that:
(raise0 αi)[Ω,Σ] RM A[Ω],
where A = Ai for some i ∈ {1, . . . , k}.
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By performing the substitutions, we can rewrite the realizer as raise0 ri so we need to
prove that:
raise0 ri RM A.
This follows by Proposition 2 since by assumption ri RM Ai[Ω].
Atm We have to prove that:
(raisel(λγUnit1 . · · · λγUnitl . ∗)r1 · · · rl)[Ω,Σ] RM P[Ω].
By performing the substitutions, we can rewrite the realizer as:
raisel(λγUnit1 . · · · λγUnitl . ∗)r1[Ω,Σ] · · · rl[Ω,Σ].
By inductive hypothesis we know that
r1[Ω,Σ] RM P1[Ω], . . . , rl[Ω,Σ] RM Pl[Ω],
and thus we can conclude by Proposition 2 if we can show that:
(λγUnit1 . · · · λγUnitl . ∗)r1 · · · rl RM P[Ω],
for all r1, . . . , rl that are inner realizers of P1, . . . , Pl respectively. Since
(λγUnit1 . · · · λγUnitl . ∗)r1 · · · rl,
reduces to ∗ and ∗ RM P[Ω] by definition of RM we are done.
In the following we will apply the substitutions directly without mentioning it.
∧I We have to prove that
raise2 pair p[Ω,Σ]q[Ω,Σ] RM A[Ω] ∧ B[Ω],
assuming that p[Ω,Σ] RM A[Ω] and q[Ω,Σ] RM A[Ω]. This follows by Proposition 2
since
pair pq RM A ∧ B,
for all inner realizers p of A and q of B, by definition of RM.
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∧EL We have to prove that
(raise1 prL r)[Ω,Σ] RM A[Ω],
assuming that
r[Ω,Σ] RM A[Ω] ∧ B[Ω].
This follows by Proposition 2 if
prL r RM A[Ω],
for any inner realizer r of A[Ω] ∧ B[Ω]. This is the case because from r RM A ∧ B if
and only if prL r RM A by definition of RM.
∧ER Very similar to the proof for ∧EL.
∨IL We have to show that:
raise1 inL p[Σ,Ω] RM A[Ω] ∨ B[Ω],
assuming that:
p[Σ,Ω] RM A[Ω].
This follows by Proposition 2 if
inL p RM A[Ω],
for any inner realizer p of A[Ω]. This is the case since p RM A[Ω] if and only if
inL p RM A[Ω] ∨ B[Ω] by definition of RM.
∨IR Very similar to the proof for ∨IL.
∨E We have to show that:
star1(λγ|A|M+|B|M . case γ(λα|A|M .p[Ω,Σ])(λβ|B|M .q[Ω,Σ]))r[Ω,Σ] RM C[Ω]
assuming by inductive hypothesis that:
1. r[Ω,Σ] RM A[Ω] ∨ B[Ω],
2. p[Ω,Σ, α B p] RM C[Ω] for any inner realizer p of A[Ω],
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3. q[Ω,Σ, β B q] RM C[Ω] for any inner realizer q of B[Ω].
We can conclude by Proposition 1 if we show that
(λγ|A|M+|B|M . case γ(λα|A|M .p[Ω,Σ])(λβ|B|M .q[Ω,Σ]))r,
which β-reduces to
case r(λα|A|M .p[Ω,Σ])(λβ|B|M .q[Ω,Σ]), (3.1)
is a monadic realizer of C[Ω] for any inner realizer r of A[Ω] ∨ B[Ω].
By definition of RM, we know that either r { inL p where p is an inner realizer of
A[Ω] or r { inR q where q is an inner realizer of B[Ω]. Assume that we are in the first
case (the second case is analogous). Then (3.1) becomes:
case(inL p)(λα|A|M .p[Ω,Σ])(λβ|B|M .q[Ω,Σ]),
which reduces to
(λα|A|M .p[Ω,Σ])p,
and to
p[Ω,Σ, α B p],
which is a monadic realizer of C[Ω] by inductive hypothesis.
→ I We have to show that:
raise0(λα
|A|M
k+1 .r[Ω,Σ]) RM A[Ω]→ B[Ω],
assuming that:
r[Ω,Σ, αk+1 B p] RM B[Ω],
for any inner realizer p of A[Ω]. By Proposition 2 it is enough to show that:
λα|A|Mk+1 .r[Ω,Σ] RM A[Ω]→ B[Ω].
By definition of RM this holds if and only if:
(λα|A|Mk+1 .r[Ω,Σ])p RM B[Ω],
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for any inner realizer p of A[Ω]. Reducing we get:
r[Ω,Σ][αk+1 B p]) RM B[Ω],
and since r[Ω,Σ][αk+1 B p] ≡ r[Ω,Σ, αk+1 B p], we can conclude by the inductive
hypothesis.
→ E We have to show that:
(star2(λγ
|A|M→|B|M
1 .λγ
|A|M
2 .γ1γ2)r[Ω,Σ]p[Ω,Σ]) RM B[Ω],
assuming by inductive hypothesis that:
1. r[Ω,Σ] RM A[Ω]→ B[Ω],
2. p[Ω,Σ] RM A[Ω].
This follows by Proposition 2 if:
(λγ|A|M→|B|M1 .λγ
|A|M
2 .γ1γ2)rp,
which β-reduces to
rp,
is a monadic realizer of B[Ω] for any inner realizers r and p of A[Ω] → B[Ω] and
A[Ω] respectively. This follows immediately by definition of RM.
In the following cases we assume that Ω does not contain a substitution for the variable x
and we write it explicitly when it is needed.
∀I We have to show that:
raise0(λxNat.r[Ω,Σ]) RM ∀x. A[Ω],
assuming by inductive hypothesis that:
r[Ω, x B n,Σ] RM A[Ω, x B n],
for any natural number n. This follows by Proposition 2 if:
(λxNat.r[Ω,Σ]) RM ∀x. A[Ω],
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which by definition of RM means that:
(λxNat.r[Ω,Σ])n RM A[Ω, x B n],
for any natural number n. By β-reducing we get:
r[Ω, x B n,Σ] RM A[Ω, x B n],
which holds by inductive hypothesis.
∀E We have to show that:
(star1(λγNat→‖A‖M .γ(t[Ω])))r[Ω,Σ] RM (A[x B t])[Ω],
assuming by inductive hypothesis that:
r[Ω,Σ] RM ∀x. A[Ω].
This follows by Proposition 1 if:
(λγNat→‖A‖M .γ(t[Ω])))r { r(t[Ω]),
is a monadic realizer of A[Ω], for any inner realizer r of ∀x. A[Ω]. This follows by
definition of RM for r RM ∀x. A[Ω], since t[Ω] is closed and thus reduces to a numeral.
∃I We have to show that:
raise1(λγ|A|M . pair t[Ω]γ)r[Ω,Σ] RM ∃x. A[Ω],
assuming by inductive hypothesis that:
r[Ω,Σ] RM A[Ω, x B t].
This follows by Proposition 2 if:
(λγ|A|M . pair t[Ω]γ)r { pair t[Ω]r
is an inner realizer of ∃x. A[Ω], for any inner realizer r of A[Ω, x B t]. This follows
by definition of RM.
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∃E We have to show that:
star1(λγNat×|A|M .(λyNat.λα|A|M .r2[Ω,Σ])(prL γ)(prR γ))r1[Ω,Σ] RM C[Ω],
assuming by inductive hypothesis that:
1. r1[Ω,Σ] RM ∃x. A[Ω],
2. r2[Ω, y B n,Σ, α B r] RM C[Ω], for any natural number n and any inner realizer
r of A[Ω].
This follows by Proposition 1 and by the inductive hypothesis on r1 if, for any inner
realizer r1 of ∃x. A[Ω]:
(λγNat×|A|M .(λyNat.λα|A|M .r2[Ω,Σ])(prL γ)(prR γ))r1 {
{ (λyNat.λα|A|M .r2[Ω,Σ])(prL r1)(prR r1) {
{ ((r2[Ω,Σ])[y B prL r1])[α B prR r1] ≡
≡ r2[Ω, y B prL r1,Σ, α B prR r1].
is a monadic realizer of C[Ω]. By definition of RM we have that prR r1 RM A[x B
prL r1] and thus we can conclude by the inductive hypothesis on r2.
Ind We have to show that:
(raise0(crec∞ f ))[Ω,Σ] RM (∀x. A)[Ω],
assuming that, for all naturals numbers n and for all p : Nat→ T (Unit→ T |A|M) such
that p RM ∀z. z < n→ A[x B z]:
r[Ω, y B n,Σ, αk+1] B p] RM A[x B y][Ω, y B n].
Note that A[x B y][Ω, y B n] is just A[Ω, x B n]. By Proposition 2 we get the
conclusion if crec∞ f [Ω,Σ] RM ∀x. A[Ω], which by definition of RM means that
crec∞ f [Ω,Σ]n RM A[Ω, x B n]
for any natural number n. In order to show this we shall prove that for any natural
number n and any ω ∈ N ∪ {∞} such that either ω = ∞ or ω > n, we have:
crecω f [Ω,Σ]n RM A[Ω, x B n].
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We proceed by complete induction on n, so we assume that the statement holds for all
natural numbers m such that m < n. We begin by reducing the realizer (in the first step
we use the assumption on ω:
crecω f [Ω,Σ]n{ f [Ω,Σ]n(crecn f [Ω,Σ])
{ (λα.r[Ω, y B n])(λzNat. raise0(λ Unit. crecn f [Ω,Σ]z))
{ r[Ω, y B n,Σ, α B λzNat. raise0(λ Unit. crecn f [Ω,Σ]z)]
Then we have to show that:
r[Ω, y B n,Σ, α B λzNat. raise0(λ Unit. crecn f [Ω,Σ]z)] RM A[Ω, x B n].
This follows from the inductive hypothesis on the premise of the complete induction
rule if we can show that:
λzNat. raise0(λ Unit. crecn f [Ω,Σ]z) RM ∀z. z < n→ A[x B z].
By definition of RM this is the case if:
raise0(λ Unit. crecn f [Ω,Σ]m) RM m < n→ A[x B m],
for all natural numbers m. By Property MR1 this follows from:
λ Unit. crecn f [Ω,Σ]m RM m < n→ A[x B m].
Again by definition of RM this is equivalent to showing that for any u : Unit such that
u RM m < n we have:
crecn f [Ω,Σ]m RM A[x B m].
Note that, since u : Unit, u { ∗, so there are two possible cases: either m < n is true
and then u RM m <RM n for any u : Unit or m < n is false and no u : Unit can realize
m < n. In both cases the statement holds: in the former case by inductive hypothesis
on m and in the latter case trivially since the universal quantification on u is empty.

Theorem 1 entails that any specific monadic realizability notion is a sound semantics
for at least HA. Later, when we prove that HA + EM1 is sound with respect to interactive
realizability semantics, we will only need to show that EM1 is sound since the soundness of
HA derives from Theorem 1.
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3.3 Monadic Interactive Realizability
In this section we define interactive realizability as a particular notion of monadic realizabil-
ity. Thus we show that monadic realizability may realize a sub-classical principle, in this
case excluded middle restricted to semi-decidable statements.
3.3.1 A Syntactic Monad for Interactive Realizability
In order to describe the computational properties of interactive realizability (see [2]) we
need to define a suitable monad. As we said, interactive realizability is based on the idea of
learning by trial and error. We express the idea of trial and error with an exception monad: a
term of intended type X has actual type X + Ex, where Ex is the type of exceptions, so that a
computation may either return its intended value or an exception. The learning part, which is
described by the dependency on a knowledge state, fits with a part of the side-effects monad
(see [18] for more details): a term of intended type X has actual type State→ X, where State
is the type of knowledge states, so that the value of a computation may change with the state.
The syntactic monad we are about to define for interactive realizability combines these two
monads.
We need to extend system T ′ with two base types State and Ex and a term constant that
“merges” two exceptions into one:
merge : Ex→ Ex→ Ex.
We shall avoid defining a specific syntax for terms of type State and Ex. Instead we exhibit
their intended interpretation and, using this interpretation as a guide, we shall require some
properties on reductions involving them.
We write Rk for the set of symbols of the k-ary predicates in HA. The intended interpre-
tation of a (knowledge) state s is a partial function
~s :
 ∞⋃
k=0
Rk+1 × Nk
⇀ N,
that sends a k + 1-ary predicate symbol P and a k-tuple of parameters m1, . . . ,mk ∈ N to a
witness for ∃x. P(m1, . . . ,mk, x). We interpret the fact that a state s is undefined for some
P,m1, . . . ,mk as a lack of knowledge about a suitable witness. This is either due to the state
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being incomplete, meaning that there exists a suitable witness m we could use to extend
the state by setting s(P, (m1, . . . ,mk)) = m, or to the fact that there are no suitable witness,
meaning that ∀x. ¬P(m1, . . . ,mk, x) holds3. We require that s satisfies two properties. The
first is for s to be sound, meaning that its values are actually witnesses. More precisely:
~s(P, (m1, . . . ,mk)) = m entails P(m1, . . . ,mk,m).
The second is that s is finite, namely that the domain of s (the set of values s is defined on)
is finite. This because we want a knowledge state to encode a finite quantity of information.
Let ~State, the set of all finite sound states, be the intended interpretation of the type State.
Recall that there is a canonical partial order on states given by the extension relation: we
write s1 ≤ s2 and read “s2 extends s1” if and only if s2 is defined whenever s1 is and with
the same value.
An exception e : Ex is produced when we instantiate an assumption of the form ∀x.
¬P(m1, . . . ,mk, x) with some m such that ¬P(m1, . . . ,mk,m) does not actually hold (remem-
ber that we proceed by trial and error, in particular we may assume things that are actually
false). This means that m is a witness for ∃x. P(m1, . . . ,mk, x), in particular it could be
used to extend the knowledge state on values where it was previously undefined. The role
of exceptions is to encode information about the discovery of new witnesses: since we use
this information to extend states the intended interpretation of an exception e is as a partial
function:
~e : ~State⇀ ~State.
Since e extends states we require that s ≤ e(s). We interpret an exception as a partial function
because an exception e may fail to extend some state s. The reason is that e may contain
information about a witness m′ for an existential statement ∃x. P(m1, . . . ,mk, x) on which s
is already defined as m. Note that an existential formula can have more that one witness so
two cases may arise: either m = m′, meaning that the information of e is already part of s or
m , m′ so that the information of e is incompatible with the information of the state. In the
first case e(s) = s, while in the second case e(s) is not defined.
3Here we are using EM1 at the metalevel in order to explain the possible situations. Using a principle at the
metalevel in order to justify the same principle in the logic is a common practice. In our treatment this is not
problematic because we never claim to be able to effectively decide which situation we are in.
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Before defining the syntactic monad IR for interactive realizability, we need to introduce
some terminology on exceptions and states.
Definition 8 (Terminology on Exceptions and States). We say that a term of type X + Ex is
either a regular value a if it reduces to inL a for some term a : X or an exceptional value
if it reduces to inR e for some term e : Ex. We say that a term of type State → X is a state
function. Finally we say that an exception e properly extends s if e(s) is defined and s < e(s).
Note that different exceptions might be used to extend a knowledge state in incompatible
ways, that is, by sending the same predicate symbol and the same tuple of parameters into
different witnesses. The role of the merge function is to put together the information from
two exceptions into a single exception. This means that merge cannot simply put together
all the information from its argument: if such information contains more that one distinct
witness for the same existential statement it must choose one in some arbitrary way, for in-
stance the leftmost or the minimum witness. Many choices for merge are possible, provided
that they satisfy the following property:
e1 properly extends s
e2 properly extends s
 entails that merge e1e2 properly extends s, (EX)
for any state s and exceptions e1, e2. Simple choices for merge are the projections, always
selecting the first or the second argument, or any combination of them using an arbitrary
criterion to select which value to return. Of course, in general there is no need for merge e1e2
to be e1 or e2.
Before the definition we give an informal description of IR. The monad IR maps a type
X to State → (X + Ex), that is, values of type X are lifted to state functions that can throw
exceptions. The term unitIR maps a value a : X to a constant state function that returns the
regular value a. If f : X → TIRY then starIR f is a function with two arguments, a state s
and a state function a : TIRX. It evaluates a on s: if this results in a regular value a : X it
applies f to a, otherwise it propagates the exceptional value. Lastly, if a : TIRX and b : TIRY
are two state functions, then mergeIR ab is a state function that evaluates its arguments on
its state argument: when both arguments are regular values it returns their pair, otherwise it
propagates the exception(s), using merge if both arguments are exceptional values.
We are now ready to give the formal definition of IR.
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Definition 9 (Interactive Realizability Monad). Let IR be the tuple (TIR, unitIR, starIR,
mergeIR), where
TIRX = State→ (X + Ex),
unitXIR ≡ λxX .λ State. inX,ExL x,
starX,Y
IR ≡ λ f X→TIRY .λxTIRX .λsState. caseX,Ex,Y+Ex(xs)(λxX . f xs) inY,ExR ,
mergeX,Y
IR ≡ λxTIRX .λyTIRY .λsState. caseX,Ex,(X×Y)+Ex(xs)
(λxX . caseY,Ex,(X×Y)+Ex(ys)(λyY . inX×Y,ExL (pair xy)) in
X×Y,Ex
R )
(λeEx1 . case
Y,Ex,(X×Y)+Ex(ys)(λ Y . inX×Y,ExR e1)(λe
Ex
2 . in
X×Y,Ex
R (merge e1e2))),
for some merge satisfying Property EX.
The term unitXIR takes a value a : X and produces a constant state function that returns the
regular (as opposed to exceptional) value a. The term starX,Y
IR takes a function f : X → TIRY
and returns a function f ′ which lifts the domain of f to TIRX. The state function returned
by f ′ when applied to some a : TIRX behaves as follows: it evaluates a on the state and if as
is a regular value a : X it returns f a; otherwise if as is an exception it simply propagates the
exception.
as bs
a f a
e e
The term mergeX,Y
IR takes two state functions a : TIRX and b : TIRY and returns a state
function c : TIR(X × Y). When both arguments are regular values it returns their pair,
otherwise it propagates the exception(s), using merge if both arguments are exceptional.
as bs cs
a b pair ab
e1 b e1
a e2 e2
e1 e2 merge e1e2
We still need to check that Definition 9 is correct and that IR really is a syntactic monad.
Proposition 3 (The Syntactic Monad IR). IR is a syntactic monad.
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Proof. We just need to check that unitIR, starIR and mergeIR satisfy all the properties in
Definition 4. This amounts to perform some reductions.
M1 Given any x : TIRX, we have:
starX,X
IR unit
X
IR x
≡ (λ f X→TIRX .λxTIRX .λsState. caseX,Ex,X+Ex(xs)(λxX . f xs) inX,ExR ) unitXIR x
→β (λxTIRX .λsState. caseX,Ex,X+Ex(xs)(λxX . unitXIR xs) inX,ExR )x
→β λsState. caseX,Ex,X+Ex(xs)(λxX . unitXIR xs) inX,ExR
≡ λsState. caseX,Ex,X+Ex(xs)(λxX .(λxX .λ State. inX,ExL x)xs) inX,ExR
→β λsState. caseX,Ex,X+Ex(xs)(λxX .(λ State. inX,ExL x)s) inX,ExR
→β λsState. caseX,Ex,X+Ex(xs)(λxX . inX,ExL x) inX,ExR
=η λsState. caseX,Ex,X+Ex(xs) in
X,Ex
L in
X,Ex
R
=× λsState.xs
=η x,
as required by Property M1.
M2 Given any f : X → TIRY and x : X, we have:
starX,Y
IR f (unit
X
IR x)
≡ (λ f X→TIRY .λxTIRX .λsState. caseX,Ex,Y+Ex(xs)(λxX . f xs) inY,ExR ) f (unitXIR x)
→β (λxTIRX .λsState. caseX,Ex,Y+Ex(xs)(λxX . f xs) inY,ExR )(unitXIR x)
→β λsState. caseX,Ex,Y+Ex(unitXIR xs)(λxX . f xs) inY,ExR
≡ λsState. caseX,Ex,Y+Ex((λxX .λ State. inX,ExL x)xs)(λxX . f xs) inY,ExR
→β λsState. caseX,Ex,Y+Ex(inX,ExL x)(λxX . f xs) inY,ExR
→× λsState.(λxX . f xs)x
→β λsState. f xs
=η f x,
as required by Property M2.
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M3 Given any x : X and y : Y , we have:
mergeIR(unitIR x)(unitIR y)
≡ (λxTIRX .λyTIRY .λsState. caseX,Ex,(X×Y)+Ex(xs)
(λxX . caseY,Ex,(X×Y)+Ex(ys)(λyY . inX×Y,ExL (pair xy)) in
X×Y,Ex
R )
(λeEx1 . case
Y,Ex,(X×Y)+Ex(ys)(λxY . inX×Y,ExR e1)(λe
Ex
2 . in
X×Y,Ex
R (merge e1e2))))
(unitIR x)(unitIR y)
→β λsState. caseX,Ex,(X×Y)+Ex(unitIR xs)
(λxX . caseY,Ex,(X×Y)+Ex(unitIR ys)(λyY . inX×Y,ExL (pair xy)) in
X×Y,Ex
R )(. . . )
≡ λsState. caseX,Ex,(X×Y)+Ex((λxX .λ State. inX,ExL x)xs)
(λxX . caseY,Ex,(X×Y)+Ex(unitIR ys)(λyY . inX×Y,ExL (pair xy)) in
X×Y,Ex
R )(. . . )
→β λsState. caseX,Ex,(X×Y)+Ex(inX,ExL x)
(λxX . caseY,Ex,(X×Y)+Ex(unitIR ys)(λyY . inX×Y,ExL (pair xy)) in
X×Y,Ex
R )(. . . )
→+ λsState. caseY,Ex,(X×Y)+Ex(unitIR ys)(λyY . inX×Y,ExL (pair xy)) inX×Y,ExR
≡ λsState. caseY,Ex,(X×Y)+Ex((λyY .λ State. inY,ExL y)ys)(λyY . inX×Y,ExL (pair xy)) inX×Y,ExR
→β λsState. caseY,Ex,(X×Y)+Ex(inY,ExL y)(λyY . inX×Y,ExL (pair xy)) inX×Y,ExR
→+ λsState.(λyY . inX×Y,ExL (pair xy))y
→β λsState. inX×Y,ExL (pair xy)
≡ unitX×YIR (pair xy),
as required by Property M3.

3.3.2 The Interactive Realizability Semantics
We now define a family of monadic realizability relations, one for each state s, requiring that
a realizer, applied to a knowledge state s, either realizes a formula in the sense of the BHK
semantics or can extend s with new knowledge.
Definition 10 (Interactive Realizability Relation). Let s be a state, r : ‖A‖IR be a term
and A a closed formula. We define two realizability relations Rs
IR and R
s
IR by simultaneous
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induction on the structure of A:
• r Rs
IR A if and only if we have that rs is either a regular value r such that r R
s
IR A or
an exceptional value e such that e properly extends s,
• Rs
IR is defined in terms of R
s
IR by the clauses in Definition 6.
We say that r (resp. r) is a monadic (resp. inner) interactive realizer of A with respect to s
when r : ‖A‖IR (resp. r : |A|IR) and r RsIR A (resp. r RsIR A).
In order to show that any interactive realizability relations with respect to a state is a
monadic realizability relation we need to verify that is satisfies the required properties.
Proposition 4 (The Monadic Realizability Relation Rs
IR). For any state s, R
s
IR is a monadic
realizability relation.
Proof. Let s be any state. We have to show that Rs
IR satisfies the properties in Definition 6.
MR1 We begin with Property MR1, namely, for any inner interactive realizer r of a formula
A with respect to s, we show that:
unitIR r RsIR A.
By unfolding the definition of unitIR we have that:
unitIR rs { (λ State. inL r)s
{ inL r,
thus, by definition of Rs
IR, we have to check that r R
s
IR A, which holds by assumption.
MR2 In order to show Property MR2, for any formulas A and B, we take an inner interactive
realizer r of A→ B with respect to s, that is, a term r : |A|IR → ‖B‖IR such that rp is a
monadic interactive realizer of B with respect to s, for any inner interactive realizer p
of A with respect to s. Then we have to show that, given a monadic interactive realizer
p of A with respect to s, we have:
starIR rp RsIR B.
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By definition of Rs
IR we apply s to the realizer and by unfolding the definition of
starIR and reducing we get:
starIR rps { case(ps)(λx|A|IR .rxs) inR . (3.2)
Since p Rs
IR A, we know that ps reduces to either a regular value inL p, for some inner
realizer p of A with respect to s, or an exceptional value inR e, for some exception e
that properly extends s.
• In the former case, (3.2) reduces to rps. By the assumptions we made on r and p,
rp is a monadic interactive realizer of B with respect to s, and thus rps reduces
to either a regular value which is an inner interactive realizer of B with respect to
s or an exceptional value which properly extends s. Thus starIR rp is a monadic
interactive realizer of B with respect to s as required.
• In the latter case, (3.2) reduces to inR e. Since e properly extends s, starIR rp is
again a monadic interactive realizer of B with respect to s as required.
MR3 Finally we have to show Property MR3. We assume that p and q are monadic inter-
active realizers of A and B respectively, both with respect to s. Then we have to show
that:
mergeIR pq R
s
IR A ∧ B.
By definition of Rs
IR, this means we have to show that
mergeIR pqs
reduces to either a regular value which is an inner interactive realizers Since p and q
are monadic interactive realizers, ps and qs either reduce to regular values inL p and
inL q, where p and q are inner interactive realizers of respectively A and B with respect
to s, or to exceptional values inR e1 and inR e2, where e1 and e2 properly extend s. By
unfolding the definition of mergeIR and reducing we get:
mergeIR pqs { case(ps)(λx
|A|IR . case(qs)(λy|B|IR . inL(pair xy)) inR)
(λeEx1 . case(qs)(λ
|B|IR . inR e1)(λeEx2 . inR(merge e1e2)))
(3.3)
We distinguish four cases depending on how ps and qs reduce:
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ps { inL p and qs { inL q In this case (3.3) reduces as follows:
mergeIR pqs { case(qs)(λy
|B|IR . inL(pair py)) inR
{ inL(pair pq).
Since it is a regular value, we have to show that pair pq Rs
IR A ∧ B. This follows
by definition of Rs
IR and from the assumption that p R
s
IR A and q R
s
IR B.
ps { inL p and qs { inR e2 In this case (3.3) reduces as follows:
mergeIR pqs { case(qs)(λy
|B|IR . inL(pair py)) inR
{ inR e2.
Since it is an exception value, we have to show that e2 properly extends s. This
follows by the assumption that q Rs
IR B.
ps { inR e1 and qs { inL q In this case (3.3) reduces as follows:
mergeIR pqs { case(qs)(λ
|B|IR . inR e1)(λeEx2 . inR(merge e1e2))
{ inR e1
Since it is an exception value, we have to show that e1 properly extends s. This
follows by the assumption that p Rs
IR A.
ps { inR e1 and qs { inR e2
mergeIR pqs { case(qs)(λ
|B|IR . inR e1)(λeEx2 . inR(merge e1e2))
{ inR(merge e1e2)
Since it is an exception value, we have to show that merge e1e2 properly extends
s. By Property EX, this happens whenever both e1 and e2 properly extends s.
This is the case by the assumption that p Rs
IR A and q R
s
IR B. 
Following Definition 7, for each state s, the monadic realizability relation Rs
IR induces
a monadic realization semantics, which realizes HA by Theorem 1. We employ this family
of semantics indexed by a state in order to define another one, which does not depend on a
state.
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Definition 11 (Interactive Realizability Semantics). We say that the decorated sequent Γ IR
r : A is valid if and only if it is valid with respect to the semantics induced by each Rs
IR for
every state s.
We shall show how we can realize EM1 in this semantics.
3.3.3 Realizing the Excluded Middle Axiom
Interactive realizability aims at producing a realizer of the EM1 axiom, a weakened form of
the excluded middle restricted to Σ01 formulas. A generic instance of EM1 is written as:
EM1(P, t1, . . . , tk) ≡ (∀y. P(t1, . . . , tk, y)) ∨ (∃y. ¬P(t1, . . . , tk, y)).
for any k + 1-ary relation P and arithmetic terms t1, . . . , tk. We call universal (resp. existen-
tial) disjunct the first (resp. the second) disjunct of EM1(P, t1, . . . , tk). For more information
on EM1 see [1].
The main hurdle we have to overcome in order to build a realizer of EM1(P, t1, . . . , tk)
is that, by the well-known undecidability of the halting problem, there is no total recursive
function that can choose which one of the disjuncts holds. Moreover, if the realizer chooses
the existential disjunct, it should also be able to provide a witness.
As we said before terms of type State contain knowledge about witnesses of Σ01 formulas.
In order to query a state s for a witness n of ∃y. P(n1, . . . , nk, y) for some natural numbers
n1, . . . , nk, we need to extend system T ′ with the family of term constants:
queryP : State→ Nat→ · · · → Nat︸                ︷︷                ︸
k
→ Unit + Nat.
indexed by P ∈ Rk+1 (and implicitly by k ≥ 0). The value of queryP sn1 · · · nk should
be either ∗ if the s contains no information about such an n or a numeral n such that
~P(n1, . . . , nk, n) is true. More formally we require that queryP satisfies the following syn-
tactic property:
queryP sn1 · · · nk { inR n entails that P(n1, . . . , nk, n) holds (IR1)
for all natural numbers n1, . . . , nk. This amounts to require that state do not answer with
wrong witnesses and it follows immediately from the intended interpretation if we suitably
define queryP sn1 · · · nk using ~s(P, (n1, . . . , nk)).
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An interactive realizer rP of EM1(P) will behave as follows. When it needs to choose one
of the disjuncts it queries the state. If the state answer with a witness, rP reduces to a realizer
r∃ of the existential disjunct containing the witness given by the state. Otherwise we can
only assume (since we do not know any witness) that the universal disjunct holds and thus
rP reduces to a realizer r∀ of the universal disjunct. This assumption may be wrong if the
state is not big enough. When r∀ is evaluated on numerals (this correspond to the fact that an
instance P(n1, . . . , nk, n) of the universal disjunct assumption is used in the proof), r∀ checks
whether the instance holds. If this is not the case the realizer made a wrong assumption
and r∀ reduces to an exceptional value, with the effect of halting the regular reduction and
returning the exceptional value. For this we need to extend the system T ′ with the last family
of terms:
evalP : Nat→ · · · → Nat︸                ︷︷                ︸
k
→ Nat→ Unit + Ex,
again indexed by P ∈ Rk. We shall need evalP to satisfy the following property:
evalP n1 · · · nkn{ inL ∗ entails that P(n1, . . . , nk, n) does not hold, (IR2)
for all natural numbers n1, . . . , nk, n. This guarantees that if the universal disjunct instance
does not hold evalP reduces to an exceptional value. Thus an interactive realizer which uses
a false instance of an universal assumption cannot reduce to a regular value.
The last property we need is that for any state s and natural numbers n1, . . . , nk,
queryP sn1 · · · nk { inL ∗
eval n1 · · · nk { inR e
 entails that e properly extends s. (IR3)
This condition guarantees that we have no “lazy” realizers that throw exceptions encoding
witnesses that are already in the state.
ow we can define a realizer for EM1(P, t1, . . . , tk) as follows:
emN(P, t1, . . . , tk) ≡ λsState. inL(case(queryP st1 · · · tk)
(λ Unit. inL(λyNat.λ State. evalP t1 · · · tky))
(λyNat. inR(pair y unitIR))).
Of course we need to check that our definition is correct.
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Proposition 5 (Interactive Realizer for EM1). Given any EM1 instance EM1(P, t1, . . . , tk),
the decorated sequent:
α1 : A1, . . . , αl : Al IR emN(P, t1, . . . , tk) : EM1(P, t1, . . . , tk), (3.4)
is valid with respect to the interactive realizability semantics given in Definition 11.
Proof. Let r and A stand for emN(P, t1, . . . , tk) and EM1(P, t1, . . . , tk) in the following proof.
By Definition 11, we have to prove that (3.4) is valid with respect to the semantics induced
by Rs
IR for any given state s.
Let the free (arithmetic) variables of A be x1, . . . , xm and let Ω ≡ x1 B n1, . . ., xm B nm
be a substitution for them. Let Σ be a substitution for the assumption variables in Γ. Note
that the only free variables in r are arithmetic, thus r[Σ] is the same as r.
Thus we have to prove that
r[Σ,Ω] RsIR A[Ω].
By definition of Rs
IR, we apply s and reduce:
r[Σ,Ω]s { inL(case(queryP st1[Ω] · · · tk[Ω])
(λ Unit. inL(λyNat.λ State. evalP t1[Ω] · · · tk[Ω]y))
(λyNat. inR(pair y unitIR))),
and since r[Σ,Ω]s is a regular value, r[Σ,Ω] is a monadic realizer of A if and only if:
case(queryP st1[Ω] · · · tk[Ω])
(λ Unit. inL(λyNat.λ State. evalP t1[Ω] · · · tk[Ω]y))
(λyNat. inR(pair y unitIR)).
(3.5)
is an inner realizer for A. queryP st1[Ω] · · · tk[Ω] reduces either to inL ∗ or to inR n for some
natural number n. We distinguish the two cases.
inL ∗ In the first case (3.5) reduces to:
inL(λyNat.λ State. evalP t1[Ω] · · · tk[Ω]y).
By definition of Rs
IR, this is an inner realizer for A if and only if:
r∀ ≡ λyNat.λ State. evalP t1[Ω] · · · tk[Ω]y,
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is an inner realizer for ∀y. P(t1[Ω], . . . , tk[Ω], y). Again by definition of RsIR, this is the
case if and only if
r∀n RsIR P(t1[Ω], . . . , tk[Ω], n),
for any natural number n. Following the definition of Rs
IR, we apply s to r∀n and
reduce:
r∀ns { evalP t1[Ω] · · · tk[Ω]n
Then r∀ns reduces either to inL ∗ or to inR e, for some exception e.
inL ∗ In the first case, we have to check that:
∗ RsIR P(t1[Ω], . . . , tk[Ω], n)
By definition of Rs
IR, this is the case if and only if P(t1[Ω], . . . , tk[Ω], n) and this
follows from Property IR2.
inR e In the second case, by definition of RsIR, we have to check that e properly extends
s and this follows from Property IR3.
inR n In this case, (3.5) reduces to:
inR(pair nunitIR).
By definition of Rs
IR, this is an inner realizer for A if and only if
pair nunitIR
is an inner realizer for
∃y. ¬P(t1[Ω], . . . , tk[Ω], y).
Again by definition of Rs
IR, this is the case if and only if
unitIR R
s
IR ¬P(t1[Ω], . . . , tk[Ω], n).
Since ¬P(t1[Ω], . . . , tk[Ω], n) is defined as P(t1[Ω], . . . , tk[Ω], n) → ⊥, again by defi-
nition of Rs
IR, we have to show that:
unitIR u RsIR ⊥,
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for any inner realizer u of P(t1[Ω], · · · , tk[Ω], n). However, by Property IR1, P(t1[Ω],
· · ·, tk[Ω], n) does not hold, so there is no such u. Thus
unitIR u RsIR ⊥
holds vacuously.

Then we can extend our proof decoration for HA (see Figure 3.1) with the new axiom
rule:
EM1
Γ IR emN(P, t1, . . . , tk) : EM1(P, t1, . . . , tk)
and show that interactive realizability realizes the whole HA + EM1.
Theorem 2 (Soundness of HA + EM1 with respect to Interactive Realizability Semantics).
Let D be a derivation of Γ ` A in HA + EM1. Then Γ IR D∗ : A, where D∗ is the term
obtained by decoratingD, is valid with respect to the interactive realizability semantics.
Proof. By definition of interactive realizability semantics, we have to prove that Γ IR D∗ :
A is valid with respect to the monadic realizability semantics induced by Rs
IR for any state
s. So we fix a generic state s and proceed by induction on the structure of the decorated
version of D, exactly as in Theorem 1, that is, we prove that each rule whose premisses are
valid has a valid conclusion. Since Rs
IR is a monadic realizability relation, this has already
been shown in the proof of Theorem 1 for all the rules in HA. We only need to check the
EM1 axiom, but we have already done this in Proposition 5. 
3.4 Conclusions
As we mentioned in the introduction, interactive realizability describes a learning by trial-
and-error process. In our presentation we focused on the evaluation of interactive realizers,
which corresponds to the trial-and-error part and is but a single step in the learning process.
For the sake of completeness, we briefly describe the learning process itself.
We can interpret an interactive realizer r of a formula A as a function f from states to
states. Recall that the intended interpretation of a term e : Ex is a function that extends
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states. Then we can define f by means of r as follows:
f (s) =
~e(s) if r{ inR e,s if r{ inL t for some t.
Note that by definition of RIR we know that in the first case ~es properly extends s. We can
think of f as a learning function: we start from a knowledge state and try to prove A with r.
If we fail, we learn some information that was not present in the state and we use it to extend
the state. If we succeed then we do not learn anything and we return the input state. Thus
note that the fixed points of f are exactly the states containing enough information to prove
A.
By composing f with itself we obtain a learning process: we start from some state (for
instance the empty one) and we apply f repeatedly. If in this repeated application eventually
produces a fixed point, the learning process ends, since we have the required information
to prove A. Otherwise we build an infinite sequence of ever increasing knowledge states
whose information is never enough to prove A. The fact that the learning process described
by interactive realizability ends is proved in Theorem 2.15 of [2].
We wish to point out one of the main differences between our presentation of interactive
realizability and the one given in [2]. In [2], the formula-as-types correspondence is closer
to the standard one. Exceptions are allowed only at the level of atomic formulas and merge is
only used in atomic rules. For instance a realizer for a conjunction A∧ B could normalize to
pair e1e2. In this case, the failure of the realizer is not apparent (at least at the top level) and
it is not clear which one of e1 or e2 we are supposed to extend the state with. In our version
exceptions are allowed at the top level of any formula and they “climb” upwards whenever
possible by means of merge.

Chapter 4
A Witness Extraction Technique by
Proof Normalization
We present a new set of reductions for derivations in natural deduction that can extract
witnesses from closed derivations of simply existential formulas in Heyting Arithmetic (HA)
plus the law of the excluded middle restricted to simply existential formulas (EM1).
The reduction we present are inspired by the informal idea of learning by making falsi-
fiable hypothesis and checking them, and by the interactive realizability interpretation. We
extract the witnesses directly from derivations in HA + EM1 by reduction, without encoding
derivations by a realizability interpretation.
4.1 Introduction
In proof theory there are reductions that express the computational interpretation we give
to logical connectives, quantifiers and, in the case of arithmetic, induction. Proofs in intu-
itionistic logic are shown to produce a witness for existential statements: any proof can be
reduced to normal form, in which no more reductions are possible, and in a normal proof of
an existential statement a witness always appears in a predictable location. We want to ob-
tain the same result for proofs of semi-decidable statements in intuitionistic logic augmented
with EM1 and reduction rules inspired by a trial-and-error interpretation.
We work in Heyting Arithmetic (HA) extended with EM1, which is weaker than classical
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arithmetic but strong enough to prove non-trivial non-constructive results: for instance the
fact that every function f : N → N has a minimum. By modifying the standard reductions
for Heyting Arithmetic (see [20]), we show that normal proofs of existential statements in
HA + EM1 produce a witness1, as they do in the intuitionistic case.
The fact that classical arithmetic is a conservative extension of HA for Π02 statements is
well known and the fact that we can extract witnesses from classical proofs of Σ01 statements
follows immediately. However proofs of these results usually employ the Go¨del-Gentzen
negative translation combined with variants of Kreisel’s modified realizability semantics or
Friedman’s translation. Here, by purely proof theoretical means, we prove a slightly weaker
result without resorting to negative translations and using reductions justified in terms of
Interactive Realizability.
An important remark is that in this chapter we do not prove strong normalization, but a
just a result on the form of normal proofs. A formal type theoretic version of the reductions
given in the following and strong normalization proof could not be included in this disserta-
tion for reasons of time, but it will appear in [3]. In this section we prove that, if we have
normalization, then all derivations of simply existential statements compute a witness by a
method we describe as trial-and-error.
4.2 A Formal System for Intuitionistic Arithmetic
As usual we work in HA + EM1, Heyting Arithmetic extended with the law of the excluded
middle for Σ01 formulas. The full description is in Section 2.1.
Since our reduction technique could conceivably be used in other first-order theories, we
isolate some general assumptions on atomic formulas and rules that we need for our results
to hold:
• closed atomic formulas are decidable,
• any true closed atomic formula has an atomic derivation,
• atomic rules do not discharge assumptions,
1Under suitable assumptions on the proof.
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• atomic rules do not bind term variables2.
The first two assumption are very reasonable in a constructive setting such as arithmetic
where we expect to have decidability at least for atomic formulas3. The other two seems
also reasonable for any first-order theory. These assumption are reasonable in a constructive
setting and they are satisfied in HA.
We assumed that any true closed atomic formula has an atomic derivation. For conve-
nience we add atomic rules for proving them in one step. Let P be a closed atomic formula.
If P is true then we add the atomic axiom:
AI P
Otherwise if P is false we add the atomic rule:
PAE ⊥
In order to work on the structure of derivations we need suitable notation and terminol-
ogy. We represent derivations as upward growing trees of formulas and we make a distinc-
tion between a formula (resp. rule) and its occurrences (resp. instances) in a derivation.
A formula can occur more than once in a derivation. While these occurrences are clearly
distinct in a tree-like representation, in order to avoid confusion when referring to them
in the text special care must be taken. Thus we make a distinction between formulas and
formula occurrences, or simply occurrences, which we label with a, b, c. In a derivation,
formula occurrences are arranged following the patterns given by the inference rules. As
with formulas, we distinguish between rules and rule instances, or simply instances, which
we label with α, β, γ. We write a derivation Π as follows:
Π1
Bb1
[C]β
Π2
Bb2rulename αAa
The only occurrence of the formula A is labeled a, while B occurs two times, with distinct
labels b1 and b2. a is the conclusion of an instance, labeled α, of an inference rule named
2The precise meaning of this will be made precise later.
3However they may very well fail in set theory, for instance with the inclusion predicate.
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rulename. a1 and a2 are the premisses of α. We also say that a is the conclusion of the
whole derivation Π. With Π1 and Π2 we denote two subderivations (as in subtree) of Π.
We distinguish subderivations by their conclusion, so we say that Πi is the (sub)derivation
of ai for i = 1, 2. By writing [C]β in square brackets above Π2, we make explicit that Π2
may contain occurrences of the assumption C, which is discharged by some undisplayed rule
instance β.
We define assumptions and open assumptions as usual in natural deduction, see [24],
page 23.
4.3 The Standard Reductions
In this section we introduce the standard reductions we need for proofs in natural deduction.
Reductive proof theory stems from the following observation: there are derivations that
are more complex than they need to be because they have unnecessary detours. When this
occurs, we can produce simpler and more direct derivations with the same conclusion by
simple structural manipulations called reductions.
In standard reductive proof theory for natural deduction, several reductions are intro-
duced: proper reductions, permutative reductions, immediate simplifications and a reduc-
tion for the induction rule (see [20]). A derivation is said to be fully normal when none of
these reductions can be performed on it. For our purposes fully normal derivations are not
required, so we introduce only the proper reductions and the induction reduction.
In an instance of an elimination rule, the premiss containing the connective or quantifier
that is being eliminated is called the major premiss; the other premisses are called the minor
premisses. We always display the major premiss in the leftmost position.
4.3.1 Proper Reductions
Consider a derivation in which a formula occurrence a is both the conclusion of an introduc-
tion rule instance α and the major premiss of an elimination rule instance β. Then we can
derive the conclusion of β directly by removing α and β and rearranging the derivations of
the premisses of α and of the minor premisses of β (if any). Note that α and β must be in-
stances of an introduction rule and an elimination rule for the same logical connective, since
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the formula introduced by α is the same formula eliminated by β. Therefore for each logical
connective we have a different type of proper reduction. They are listed in Figure 4.1.
Figure 4.1: The proper reductions.
∧−red
Π1
A1
Π2
A2∧I αA1 ∧ A2∧E βAi
∧−red−−−−→ Πi
Ai
∨−red
Π
Ai∨I A1 ∨ A2
[A1]α
Π1
B
[A2]α
Π2
B∨E αB
∨−red−−−−→
Π
Ai
Πi
B
→−red
[A]α
Π1
B→ I αA→ B
Π2
A→ E B
→−red−−−−−→
Π2
A
Π1
B
∀−red
Π∀I ∀x. A∀E A[x B t]
∀−red−−−−→ Π[x B t]
A[x B t]
∃−red
Π1
A[x B t]∃I ∃x. A
[A[x B y]]α
Π2
B∃E αB
∃−red−−−−→
Π1
A[x B t]
Π2[y B t]
B
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4.3.2 Induction Reduction
Consider the induction rule schema Ind in the following form:
Π1
A[x B 0]
[A]α
Π2
A[x B succ(x)]
Ind αA[x B t]
We call t the main term of the induction. An instance α of the Ind rule can be reduced when
the main term t in its conclusion A[x B t] is either 0 or succ(u) for some term u. Then if
t = 0 we can reduce α to:
Π1
A[x B 0]
and if t = succ(u) as:
Π1
A[x B 0]
[A]β
Π2
A[x B succ(x)]
Ind βA[x B u]
Π2[x B u]
A[x B succ(u)]
We call this conditional reduction Ind−red. It is easy to see that this reduction is “unraveling”
the induction. When u is a numeral n, that is, a term of the form succn, we can apply the
Ind−red reduction repeatedly (n times) until we remove all occurrences of the Ind rule and
get:
Π1
A[x B 0]
Π2[x B 0]
A[x B 1]
Π2[x B 1]
A[x B 2]
...
A[x B n]
4.4 The Witness Extracting Reductions
In this section we introduce an inference rule that is equivalent to the restricted excluded
middle axiom schema EM1 defined in Definition 3 and two reductions involving this new
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rule. The first one, the Wit−red reduction, is inspired by Interactive Realizability and it will
be instrumental in converting classical derivations into constructive ones. The second one is
a permutative reduction and is needed later for technical reasons.
4.4.1 The EM1 Rule
For convenience we replace the EM1 axiom schema with the equivalent EM1 rule:
[∀x. P]α
...
A
[¬P[x B y]]α
...
AEM1 αA
where the variable y does not occur in A nor in any open assumption that A depends on
except occurrences of the assumption ¬P[x B y] (as in the ∃E rule).
The EM1 rule is derived by an ∨E rule instance, whose major premiss is an instance of
the EM1 axiom and whose rightmost assumption is the major premiss of an ∃E instance:
EM1 (∀x. A) ∨ (∃x. ¬A)
[∀x. A]α
...
C
[∃x. ¬A]α
[¬A[x B y]]β
...
C∃E βC∨E αC
On the other hand, the EM1 axiom can be derived from the EM1 rule by two ∨I instances:
[∀x. A]α∨I (∀x. A) ∨ (∃x. ¬A)
[¬A[x B y]]α∃I ∃x. ¬A∨I (∀x. A) ∨ (∃x. ¬A)
EM1 α(∀x. A) ∨ (∃x. ¬A)
In the following we refer to the assumption ∀x. P in the derivation of the leftmost pre-
miss of the EM1 rule as the universal assumption and to the assumption ¬P[x B y] in the
derivation of the rightmost premiss as the existential assumption.
We can also write the EM1 rule in sequent style as:
Γ, α : ∀x. P ` A Γ, α : ∃x. ¬P ` A
EM1 α
Γ ` A
The universal assumption ∀x. P is a Π01 formula and thus negatively decidable, mean-
ing that a finite piece of evidence is enough to prove it false: a counterexample, a natural
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number m such that P[x B m] does not hold. Moreover, if we know that it is false, then a
counterexample exists and we can find it in a finite time, in the worst case by means of a
blind search through all the natural numbers.
On the other hand, in order to prove the universal assumption, we need a possibly infinite
evidence, namely, we may need to check P[x B m] for all natural numbers m and this cannot
be effectively done (at least when we have no information on P).
The existential assumption ¬P[x B y] is not actually a existential formula. However it
is easy to see that it takes the place of the assumption discharged by the ∃E rule.
We say that we can prove the existential assumption true by showing a witness, namely
a number m such that ¬P[x B m]. Thus the existential assumption behaves as if it were pos-
itively decidable: when it is true, we have a terminating algorithm to find the finite evidence
needed to prove it. However, when it false, we have no way to effectively decide if it is false.
Note that a counterexample m for the universal assumption ∀x. P is a witness for the
existential assumption since in that case ¬P[x B m] holds.
4.4.2 Witness Reduction
Consider a derivation Π ending with an instance α of the EM1 rule for the atomic formula P:
[∀x. P]α
Π1
A
[¬P[x B y]]α
Π2
AEM1 αA
A priori we do not know any counterexample to the universal assumption (we do not even
know whether it holds or not), so we begin by looking at how the assumption is used in Π1.
In Π1, consider all the instances β1, . . . , βn of the ∀E rule whose premiss is an occurrence of
the universal assumption ∀x. P and whose conclusion is the occurrence of a closed (atomic)
formula:
[∀x. P]α∀E β1P[x B t1]...
. . .
[∀x. P]α∀E βnP[x B tn]...
These represent the concrete instances of the universal assumption that are used to derive
A in Π1. Since the conclusions of β1, . . . , βn are closed atomic formulas they are decid-
able. Therefore we can derive the true concrete instances directly with the atomic axiomAI
instead of deducing them from the universal assumption. We distinguish two cases.
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• If P[x B ti] is true for all i we replace each βi with the atomic axiom for P[x B ti]:
[∀x. P]α∀E βiP[x B ti]...
{
AI P[x B ti]...
We call this new derivation Π′1.
Now two situations are possible: either Π1 needs the universal assumption only to
deduce the concrete instances β1, . . . , βn or not.
– The first case happens when Π′1 contains no more occurrences of the universal
assumption discharged by α, that is, the universal assumption only occurs in Π1
as the premiss of β1, . . . , βn. In this case Π′1 is a self-contained derivation of A
and we can replace the whole Π with Π′1.
– Otherwise Π′1 still contains some occurrence of the universal assumption. Then
Π′1 does need the universal assumption itself and not just some concrete instances
of it. In this case we can only replace Π1 with Π′1 in Π, but we cannot eliminate
the EM1 rule instance α from the derivation.
• Otherwise there is some i such that P[x B ti] is false. Thus the universal assumption
itself is false, since we have found the counterexample ti. Moreover ti is a witness
for the existential assumption, meaning that we can replace y with ti in Π2 and all the
occurrences of the assumption ¬P[x B y] with a derivation of ¬P[x B t]:
[¬P[x B ti]]α... {
[P[x B ti]]β
′
iAE ⊥→ I β′i¬P[x B ti]...
We call this new derivation Π′2.
Note that in this case we replace all the occurrences of the existential assumption in
Π2 and thus Π′2 is self-contained derivation of A. Therefore we can replace Π with Π
′
2.
We call this reduction Wit−red.
The gist of the Wit−red reduction is that we look for counterexamples to the universal
assumption in Π1. If we do not find one then we have checked that all the concrete instances
of the universal assumption hold. Moreover if Π1 uses the universal assumption exclusively
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to deduce these concrete instances, then we get a direct derivation of A without using the
EM1 rule. On the other hand if we find a counterexample then we know that we can put it in
Π2 and get another direct derivation of A.
In some sense we have a procedure to decide which one of the subderivation of the EM1
rule is the effective one, Note that this procedure fails when we do not find counterexamples
to the universal assumption but we cannot completely eliminate its occurrences from Π1.
Our main result can be thought of as the proof that, when the conclusion of a derivation is
simply existential, this “failure” of the procedure does not happen. The whole reduction is
summarized in Figure 4.2.
4.4.3 Permutative Reduction for EM1
The permutative reduction for EM1 is defined in the same way as the permutative reduction
for the ∨E rule, that is, when the conclusion of a EM1 rule instance is the major premiss of
an elimination rule instance ∗E:
[∀x. P]γ
Π1
A
[¬P[x B y]]γ
Π2
AEM1 γA Π¯∗E B
reduces to:
[∀x. P]α
Π1
A Π¯∗E B
[¬P[x B y]]α
Π2
A Π¯∗E BEM1 αB
where Π¯ stands for the derivations of the remaining minor premisses of β if any. We denote
this reduction as EM1−perm. More explicitly, we can define a permutative reduction for
each elimination rule, see Figure 4.3 and Figure 4.4.
This reduction moves elimination rule instances from “outside” or “below” to “inside”
or “above” an EM1 rule instance. This is useful because an EM1 rule instance may happen in
between an introduction rule instance and an elimination rule instance, preventing a proper
reduction from taking place.
In the following we concentrate on proving a result about the form of normal proofs. We
do not prove here that the reduction process converges. In order to do it, the most natural
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way would be encode our proofs into proof terms in a suitable calculus and show that such
calculus is strongly normalizing. This has been done in [3], so we just state the following
Theorem 3 (Strong Normalization of HA + EM1). All proofs of HA + EM1 are strongly
normalizing under the reductions we described in this section.
A proof can be found in [3].
4.5 Witness Extraction
In this section we prove the witness extraction theorem, that shows how we can extract
witnesses from suitable classical derivations in HA + EM1, as we can do for intuitionistic
derivations in HA.
In order to state and prove our results we need to keep track of free term variables in a
derivations, since both the Ind−red and the Wit−red reductions can only be performed when
certain terms and formulas are closed.
We need to define when a variable is free in a derivation.
Definition 12 (Free term variables). We say that a rule instance α binds a term variable that
occurs free in the derivation Π of a premiss of α in the following cases:
• α is an instance of the ∀I rule and binds the variable x in the formula occurrences in
the derivation of its premiss:
Π
A∀I α∀x. A
• α is an instance of the ∃E rule and binds the variable y in the formula occurrences in
the derivation of its rightmost premiss:
∃x. A
[A[x B y]]α
Π
B∃E αB
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• α is an instance of the Ind rule and binds the variable x in the formula occurrences in
the derivation of its rightmost premiss:
A[x B 0]
[A]α
Π
A[x B succ(x)]
Ind αA[x B t]
• α is an instance of the EM1 rule and binds the variable y in the formula occurrences
in the derivation of its rightmost premiss:
[∀x. P]α
...
B
[¬P[x B y]]α
Π
BEM1 αB
We say that a term variable occurrence is free in a derivation when the term variable occurs
free in a formula occurrence in the derivation and is not bound by any rule instance. A
derivation is closed if it has no free term variable nor open assumption.
Note that no reduction introduces free term variables in a derivation.
Since a derivation is a tree, it makes sense to give the definition of branch. Principal
branches are branches of a derivation that contains only major premisses of elimination and
EM1 rule instances.
Definition 13 (Principal branch). A branch in a derivation Π is a sequence of formula oc-
currences a0, . . . , an in Π such that:
• a0 is a top formula occurrence, that is, a0 is either an assumption or the conclusion of
an atomic axiom;
• ai and ai+1 are respectively a premiss and the conclusion of the same rule instance
αi+1, for all 0 ≤ i < n;
• an is the conclusion of Π.
A branch is principal if, for all 0 ≤ i < n such that αi is an elimination or EM1 rule instance,
ai is the major (leftmost) premiss of αi.
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We use the variables ζ, η for branches.
In order to study the properties of normal proofs we only need to consider the structure
of principal branches. A head-cut is the lowest point of a principal branch where a reduction
is possible.
Definition 14 (Head-cut). The head-cut of a principal branch ζ = a1, . . . , an is the formula
occurrence ai with the maximum index i such that one of the following holds:
• ai is the conclusion of an elimination rule instance αi, ai−1 is the major premiss of
αi and the conclusion of an introduction rule instance αi−1; when αi−1 is a ∧I rule
instance we also require that ai−2 is an occurrence of the same formula as ai (proper
reductions);
• ai is the conclusion of an Ind rule instance αi, whose main term is either 0 or succ(u)
for some term u (Ind−red reduction);
• ai is the conclusion of an EM1 rule instance α and either ai−1 is derived without using
the assumption discharged by α or a0 is an occurrence of the universal assumption
discharged by α and a1 is the occurrence of a closed atomic formula (Wit−red reduc-
tion);
• ai is the conclusion of an elimination rule instance α and ai−1 is the conclusion of an
EM1 rule instance (EM1−perm reductions).
If such an i exists we say that there is a head-cut along the branch ζ.
This definition is the result of a analysis of the conditions that must be met in order to
perform one of the reductions we have listed. In particular note how, in the condition given
for the Wit−red reduction, the fact that a1 is atomic implies that a1 is the conclusion of a ∀E
rule instance, as we assumed in defining Wit−red.
We shall show that, with suitable assumptions, we can perform the Wit−red reduction as
needed in order to extract a witness from a derivation. One of these assumptions is that the
conclusion of the derivation is “simple” enough, as we define next.
Definition 15 (Simple Formulas). We say that a formula is simply existential (resp. univer-
sal) when it is ∃x. P (resp. ∀x. P) for some atomic formula P.
We say that a formula is simple when it is closed and atomic or simply existential.
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In the following we consider the EM1 and Ind rules to be neither elimination nor intro-
duction rules and we give them special treatment.
As we shall show later, principal branches beginning with an open assumption have
particular structure in normal derivations: they begin with a sequence of elimination rule
instances, followed by atomic and EM1 rule instances and they end with introduction and
EM1 rule instances. Any of these parts may be missing.
Definition 16 (Open normal form). A principal branch a0, . . . , an is said to be in open normal
form when there exist three natural numbers nE , nA and nI such that nE + nAnI = n and:
• a0 is the occurrence of an open assumption in Π,
• ai is the conclusion of an elimination rule instance for 0 < i ≤ nE ,
• ai is the conclusion of an atomic or EM1 rule instance for nE < i ≤ nE + nA,
• anE+nA+1 is the conclusion of an introduction rule instance4,
• ai is the conclusion of an introduction or EM1 rule instance for nE + nA < i ≤ n,
nE , nA and nI are the number of elimination, atomic or EM1, introduction or EM1 rule in-
stances, respectively.
We can now prove our main result: closed normal derivations of simply existential for-
mulas in HA + EM1 can be reduced to derivations ending with an introduction rule instance.
Derivations in HA have a similar property. The theorem we are going to prove holds for
derivations that are concrete enough, namely they are: self-contained (without open assump-
tions), concrete (without open term variables) and with an effective conclusion (a simply
existential formula). The proof is split into several lemmas.
In the first lemma we show that, in a derivation of a simply existential with no free term
variables, a simply universal assumption is followed by a closed atomic formula. This will
be used later to prove that we can perform the Wit−red reduction on universal assumption
of an EM1 rule instance.
4Since EM1 rule instances can appear intermingled with both atomic and introduction rule instances, in the
definition we require that anE +nA+1 be the conclusion of an introduction rule, so that nA and nI are uniquely
determined.
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Lemma 1. Let ζ = a0, . . . , an be a principal branch in open normal form in a derivation Π
in HA + EM1, with nE , nA and nI defined as in Definition 16. Let A0, . . . , An be the formulas
a0, . . . , an are occurrences of. Then the following statements hold:
1. Ai is a non-atomic subformula of An for all nE + nA < i ≤ n;
2. if some ai is the conclusion of an introduction rule instance, then Ai is a subformula
of An;
Moreover assume that An is a simple formula. Then:
3. if a term variable x is free in some Ai, then x is free in Π;
4. if some Ai is simply universal, then ai is the premiss of a ∀E rule instance;
5. if Π has no free term variables and Ai is simply universal, then Ai+1 is a closed atomic
formula.
Proof. (2) follows immediately from (1). We need (2) to prove (3) and (4). Then, by (3) and
(4), we prove (5). Here are the proofs.
1. We proceed by induction on nI .
• If nI = 0, the thesis holds vacuously.
• If nI = 1, we need to prove the statement just for i = nE + nA + 1 = n and thus an
is the conclusion of an introduction rule instance by Definition 16. This means
that An is not atomic. Obviously it is also a subformula of itself so we are done.
• Otherwise, let nI > 1.
Consider the subderivation Π′ of Π ending with an−1 and its principal branch
ζ′ = a0, . . . , an−1. ζ′ is in open normal form in Π′, with n′E = nE , n
′
A = nA and
n′I = nI − 1. Then, by inductive hypothesis, for all nE + nA < i ≤ n − 1, Ai is a
non-atomic subformula of An−1.
By Definition 16, Π ends with an introduction or EM1 rule instance α. In both
cases An−1 is a subformula of An, since an−1 is the premiss of α and an is its
conclusion.
Thus for all nE + nA < i ≤ n, Ai is a subformula of An. Moreover since An−1 is
non-atomic then An is too.
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2. If ai is the conclusion of an introduction rule instance then nE + nA < i ≤ n by
Definition 16. Thus we conclude by (1).
3. We show that x is not bound by any rule instance and thus is free in Π. The only rule
that binds a variable above a major premiss, and thus the only rule that can bind a
variable in a principal branch, is the ∀I rule. Now assume that a ∀I rule instance occur
along ζ with conclusion a j. By the previous statement (2), A j is a subformula of An.
This yields a contradiction because by assumption An is simple and A j is universally
quantified since a j is the conclusion of a ∀I rule instance.
4. We show that ai is the premiss of a ∀E rule instance because no other alternative is
possible.
• ai cannot be the premiss of an atomic rule instance, since we assumed that Ai is
simply universal and thus not atomic.
• ai cannot be the premiss of an introduction rule instance, since in that case Ai+1
is a subformula of An by (2). Therefore a simply universal formula Ai is a sub-
formula of a simple formula An, which is a contradiction.
• Finally ai cannot be the premiss of an EM1 rule instance. More precisely assume
that ai is followed by exactly j > 0 instances of the EM1 rule. Then ai+ j is the
conclusion of the last EM1 rule instance α and Ai+ j is the same formula as Ai, in
particular Ai+ j is simply universal. By definition of open normal form, EM1 rule
instances can only be followed by introduction, atomic or EM1 rule instances.
Since we assumed that there are exactly j instances of the EM1 rule, ai+ j is the
premiss of either an atomic or introduction rule instance. Then we are in one of
the previous cases and we have a contradiction.
Then ai can only be the premiss of an elimination rule instance and, being Ai simply
universal, it must be an instance of the ∀E rule.
5. By (4) we known that ai+1 is the conclusion of a ∀E rule instance whose premiss is
simply universal. Therefore Ai+1 is an atomic formula. If Ai+1 has a free term variable,
Π has too by (3). Since we assumed that Π has no free term variable, Ai+1 must be
closed. Therefore Ai+1 is a closed atomic formula. 
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
In the following lemma we show how we can apply the Wit−red reduction.
Lemma 2 (EM1 reduction). Let Π be a derivation in HA+EM1 with no free term variables.
Assume that Π ends with an EM1 rule instance α whose conclusion is an occurrence of a
simple formula. Assume that the derivation Π′ of the leftmost premiss of α has a principal
branch ζ in open normal form. Then at least one of the following occurs:
1. Π has a head-cut or a non-normal term along a principal branch,
2. Π has a principal branch in open normal form.
Proof. Let ζ = a0, . . . , an and let A0, . . . , An be the formulas a0, . . . , an are occurrences of.
Let a be the conclusion of Π and of the EM1 rule instance α:
[Aa00 ]
ζ
Π′
Aann
...
AnEM1 αAan
Note that we can extend ζ to η = a0, . . . , an, a and η is a principal branch of Π.
If a0 is not discharged by α, then η is a principal branch in open normal form and thus
we get the statement. Otherwise, a0 is discharged by α, meaning that A0 is the universal
assumption of the EM1 instance. We can apply (5) of Lemma 1 to η, since a0 is simply
universal, a is simply existential and Π has no free term variables.
Then a1 is a closed atomic formula and we can perform the Wit−red reduction, that is,
there is a head-cut along the principal branch η of Π and we can conclude. 

The following lemma shows how to handle Ind rule instances.
Lemma 3 (Induction normalization). Let Π be a derivation in HA+EM1 ending with an Ind
rule instance. Then at least one of the following holds:
1. Π has a head-cut or a non-normal term along a principal branch,
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2. Π contains a free term variable.
Proof. Let α be the Ind rule instance Π ends with and let its conclusion be an occurrence a
of some formula A[x B t]. If a has a free term variable x then x is free in Π too and we are
done. If t is not normal then all principal branches5 in Π have a non-normal term. Otherwise
t is a closed normal term and thus it is either 0 or succ(u) for some term u and e we can apply
the Ind−red reduction, meaning that any principal branch of Π has a head cut.  
The following lemma can be thought of as a weak result on the structure of derivations.
Lemma 4 (Structure of Normal Form). Let Π be a derivation in HA + EM1. Then at least
one of the following holds:
1. Π has a head-cut or a non-normal term along a principal branch;
2. Π contains a free term variable;
3. Π has a principal branch in open normal form;
4. Π ends with an introduction rule instance;
5. Π is atomic (only atomic formulas occur in Π);
6. Π ends with an EM1 instance and its conclusion is not simple.
Proof. The proof is by induction on the structure of the derivation Π, that is, we assume
that the statement holds for all subderivations of Π and we prove that it holds for the whole
derivation.
Let α be the last rule instance in Π. If α in an introduction rule instance the statement is
satisfied and we are done.
If α is an Ind rule instance then we get the statement by applying Lemma 3 to Π.
Then we only need to understand what happens when α is an elimination, an atomic or
an EM1 rule instance. Note that the only case in which α has no premisses is when α is
an atomic axiom. If this happens then Π is atomic (it is just the conclusion of α) and the
statement is satisfied.
5Since all branches of Π end with its conclusion.
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Otherwise α has one or more (when α is atomic) major premisses. Let Π′ be the deriva-
tion of any one of the major premisses of α. Any principal branch ζ of Π′ can be extended
to a branch η of Π, by appending the conclusion of Π. η is principal too because Π′ is the
subderivation of a major premiss of α. We shall use this fact often in the following.
By inductive hypothesis Π′ satisfies the statement, so we proceed by considering all the
possible cases.
1. Π′ has a head-cut or a non-normal term along a principal branch ζ. As we noted ζ can
be extended to a principal branch of Π with the same head-cut or non-normal term, so
Π satisfies the statement and we are done.
2. Π′ contains a free term variable.
There are four rules that can bind term variables: the ∀I,∃E, Ind and EM1 rules. Since
the cases when α is an introduction or Ind rule instance have been taken care of already
and since the ∃E and EM1 rules can only bind term variables in the derivation of its
minor premiss, any free term variable in Π′ is free in Π too. Thus Π satisfies the
statement.
3. Π′ has a principal branch ζ = a0, . . . , an in open normal form. Let η be the principal
branch of Π extending ζ.
[Aa00 ]
ζ
Π′
Aann . . .EM1| ∗ E|A αA
Note that elimination rule instances do not discharge assumptions in their leftmost
subderivation and atomic rule instances do not discharge assumptions in general.
Then, when α is either an elimination or atomic rule instance, the assumption a0 is
still open in Π and we have the following cases depending on how which rule an is the
conclusion of. Note that since ζ is in open normal form, an cannot be an Ind instance.
Thus we have the following cases:
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an is the conclusion of
ELIM ATOM INTRO EM1
α
ELIM EXT NO CUT PERM
ATOM EXT EXT NO NO/EXT
EXT η begins with the open assumption a0 followed by elimination and atomic rule
instances, so Π satisfies the statement;
NO this is never the case since, in a principal branch, an elimination (resp. atomic)
rule instance cannot follow an atomic (resp. introduction) rule instance, because
the major premiss (resp. conclusion) of an elimination (resp. introduction) rule
instance is not atomic and thus cannot be the conclusion (resp. premiss) of an
atomic rule instance;
CUT α is an elimination rule instance and its major premiss is the conclusion of an
introduction rule instance, thus η ends with a head-cut and again Π satisfies the
statement;
PERM when a major premiss of α is the conclusion of an EM1 rule instance we can
apply the EM1−perm reduction, thus η ends with a head-cut and Π satisfies the
statement;
NO/EXT we have two cases depending on the nI of ζ:
nI > 0 then, by (1) of Lemma 1, we have that an is an occurrence of a non atomic
formula and thus α cannot be an atomic rule instance;
nI = 0 in this case η is in open normal form and thus Π satisfies the statement.
On the other hand, if α is an EM1 rule instance then we can apply Lemma 2 to Π (since
we can safely assume that Π contains no free term variables) and we get the statement.
4. Π′ ends with an introduction rule instance β. Then the conclusion b of β cannot be
atomic and since it is a premiss of α, α cannot be atomic either. Therefore α must be
either an elimination or an EM1 rule instance.
If α is an elimination then there is a head-cut along a principal branch going through
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b so Π satisfies the statement.
...?I β
Bb . . .?E αAa
If α is an EM1 rule instance then a and b are both occurrences of the formula A. If A is
not simple then Π satisfies the statement. Otherwise we assume that A is simple: since
A cannot be atomic (it occurs as the conclusion of the introduction rule instance β) A
must be ∃x. P for some atomic formula P and β must be an ∃I rule instance. Then we
are in the following situation:
Π′′
A∃I β∃x. Pb
...
∃x. PEM1 α∃x. Pa
where Π′′ is the derivation of the premiss of β. Again note that principal branches of
Π′′ extend to principal branches of Π′ by appending b.
By inductive hypothesis Π′′ satisfies the statement, so we proceed by considering all
the possible cases.
(a) Π′′ has a head-cut or a non-normal term along a principal branch. Then Π′ does
too and we are in the previously solved case labeled 1.
(b) Π′′ contains a free term variable. Since ∃I does not bind free term variables, Π′
does too and we are in the previously solved case labeled 2.
(c) Π′′ has a principal branch ζ in open normal form. Since ∃I does not discharge
open assumptions, Π′ does too and we are in the previously solved case labeled
3.
(d) Π′′ ends with an introduction rule instance. This cannot happen because b is an
atomic formula occurrence.
(e) Π′′ is atomic. The assumption discharged by α from its leftmost subderivation
is not atomic, thus it cannot occur in Π′′ since Π′′ is atomic. Therefore we can
apply the Wit−red reduction meaning that there is a head-cut at the end of the
principal branches of Π′ and we are in the previously solved case labeled 1.
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(f) Π′′ ends with an EM1 instance and its conclusion is not simple. This cannot
happen because we assumed that A is simple and b is an occurrence of A.
5. Π′ is atomic. In this case one of major premisses of α is atomic, so α cannot be an
elimination rule instance and must be either an EM1 or atomic rule instance.
• If α is an EM1 rule instance then it is redundant: the assumption discharged by α
from its leftmost subderivation is not atomic, thus it cannot occur in Π′ since Π′
is atomic whose premisses are atomic formula occurrences. Therefore we can
apply the Wit−red reduction to α, meaning that there is a head-cut at the end of
the principal branches of Π and thus Π satisfies the statement.
• Otherwise, if α is an atomic rule instance, consider the other subderivations of
its major premisses. If they are all atomic then Π is atomic too and it satisfies the
statement. Otherwise there is a major premiss of α with a non atomic derivation
Π′′. Then one of the other cases applies with Π′′ in place of Π′.
6. Π′ ends with an EM1 rule instance β and its conclusion is not simple. α cannot be
an atomic rule instance since one of its premisses is the conclusion of β which is not
simple and thus not atomic. If α is an elimination rule instance we can apply the
EM1−perm reduction to α and β. Thus there is a head-cut at the end of the principal
branches of Π, and Π satisfies the statement. Otherwise, if α is an EM1 rule instance
then the conclusions of Π and Π′ are occurrences of the same non-simple formula.
Therefore Π again satisfies the statement.
Since we exhausted all the possible cases we are done. 
Our main theorem is now an easy corollary of the previous lemma.
Theorem 4 (Witness Extraction). Let Π be a derivation of a simple formula A in HA+EM1.
Assume that:
1. Π has no principal branch with a head-cut or a non-normal term;
2. Π contains no free term variable;
3. Π has no open assumptions;
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Then Π is either atomic or ends with a ∃I rule instance. In particular, if Π is closed, normal
and A is simply existential then Π ends with an introduction.
Proof. The hypotheses rule out most of the cases considered by Lemma 4. The only possible
cases are:
1. Π ends with an introduction rule instance,
2. Π is atomic.
Since A is simple it is either an atomic or existentially quantified formula. If A is atomic, Π
cannot end with an introduction rule instance and thus Π must be atomic. Otherwise, if A is
existentially quantified, Π cannot end with an atomic rule instance and thus Π must end with
an introduction rule instance which can only be a ∃I rule instance. 
By Theorem 3, the reduction of a derivation halts after a finite number of steps and
produces a derivation without head-cuts. Then, Theorem 4 shows that our proof reduction
can extract a witness from the derivation of a closed formula ∃x. P, which can be found in
the premise of the ∃I rule instance at the end of the normalized derivation, by the definition
of the ∃I rule.
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Figure 4.2: The Wit−red reduction possible outcomes.
Wit−red
[∀x. P]α∀E β1P[x B t1]
[∀x. P]α∀E βnP[x B tn] [∀x. P]
α
Π1
A
[P[x B y]]α
Π2
AEM1 αA
An derivation ending with an EM1 rule instance reduces to:
AI P[x B t1] AI P[x B tn] [∀x. P]α
Π1
A
[P[x B y]]α
Π2
AEM1 αA
when all P[x B ti] hold and some occurrences of the universal assumption remain.
AI P[x B t1] AI P[x B tn]
Π1
A
when all P[x B ti] hold and no occurrence of the universal assumption remains.
[P[x B ti]]β
′
AE ⊥→ I β′¬P[x B ti]
Π2
A
when some P[x B ti] does not hold.
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Figure 4.3: The permutative reductions of the EM1 rule with the ∧E,∨E and→ E rules.
EM1/∧−perm
[∀x. P]α
Π1
A1 ∧ A2
[¬P[x B y]]α
Π2
A1 ∧ A2EM1 αA1 ∧ A2∧E Ai
→
[∀x. P]α
Π1
A1 ∧ A2∧E Ai
[¬P[x B y]]α
Π2
A1 ∧ A2∧E AiEM1 αAi
EM1/∨−perm
[∀x. P]β
Σ1
A1 ∨ A2
[¬P[x B y]]β
Σ2
A1 ∨ A2EM1 βA1 ∨ A2
[A1]α
Π1
B
[A2]α
Π2
B∨E αB
↓
[∀x. P]β
Σ1
A1 ∨ A2
[A1]α
Π1
B
[A2]α
Π2
B∨E αB
[¬P[x B y]]β
Σ2
A1 ∨ A2
[A1]α
Π1
B
[A2]α
Π2
B∨E αBEM1 βB
EM1/→−perm
[∀x. P]α
Π1
A1 → A2
[¬P[x B y]]α
Π2
A1 → A2EM1 αA1 → A2
Σ
A1∧E A2
↓
[∀x. P]α
Π1
A1 → A2
Σ
A1→ E A2
[¬P[x B y]]α
Π2
A1 → A2
Σ
A1→ E A2EM1 αA2
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Figure 4.4: The permutative reductions of the EM1 rule with the ∀E and ∃E rules.
EM1/∀−perm
[∀x. P]α
Π1
∀x. A
[¬P[x B y]]α
Π2
∀x. AEM1 α∀x. A∀E A[x B t]
{
[∀x. P]α
Π1
∀x. A∀E A[x B t]
[¬P[x B y]]α
Π2
∀x. A∀E A[x B t]
EM1 αA[x B t]
EM1/∀−perm
[Σ]
[∀x. P]α
Π1
∃x. A
[¬P[x B y]]α
Π2
∃x. AEM1 α∃x. A
[A[x B y]]
B∃E B
↓
[Σ]
[∀x. P]α
Π1
∃x. A
[A[x B y]]
B∃E B
[¬P[x B y]]α
Π2
∃x. A
[A[x B y]]β
Σ
B∃E βBEM1 αB
Chapter 5
Interpreting a Geometric Example
with Interactive Realizability
In this chapter we show how to extract a monotonic learning algorithm from a classical proof
of a geometric statement by interpreting the proof by means of interactive realizability.
The statement is about the existence of a convex angle including a finite collections of
points in the real plane and it is related to the existence of a convex hull. We define real
numbers as Cauchy sequences of rational numbers, therefore equality and ordering are not
decidable. While the proof looks superficially constructive, it employs classical reasoning
to handle undecidable comparisons between real numbers, making the underlying algorithm
non-effective.
The interactive realizability interpretation transform the non-effective linear algorithm
described by the proof into an effective one that uses backtracking to learn from its mistakes.
The effective algorithm exhibit a “smart” behavior, performing comparisons only up to the
precision required to prove the final statement. This behavior is not explicitly planned but
arises from the interactive interpretation of comparisons between Cauchy sequences.
5.1 Introduction
We study the computational content of the proof of the following geometric statement.
Theorem 5 (Convex Angle). We have a finite set of at least three points in the real plane
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R2 such that no three points are on the same line. Then there exist distinct points P,Q and R
such that:
• all other points S are inside Q̂PR,
• the angle Q̂PR is convex, that is, less than pi.
P
Q
R
We choose this particular statement because we have a proof of it that looks algorithmic
and can be easily visualized. The Convex Angle Theorem be thought of as weakened version
of the existence of the convex hull of a finite set of points.
As we said proof we choose as example looks constructive, using only decidability of
ordering over real numbers. However, it is well known that there is no effective ordering
on the real numbers. In our encoding of the real numbers, totality of the ordering on the
recursive reals is equivalent to EM1. Since the proof needs the ordering to be total, it needs
EM1. Due to the low logical complexity of excluded middle which is used, the proof may be
interpreted with a simple case of interactive realizability.
We show how interactive realizability can be applied and what it can tell us about the
computational content of the proof. What we get is an algorithm that, instead of comparing
real numbers, makes an arbitrary guess about which one is smaller. If later it becomes
apparent that the guess is wrong the algorithm retracts the choice it made since it can now
make an informed decision about that particular comparison. Then the algorithm performs
comparisons only when needed and only up to the required precision.
Thus we see how a simple classical proof which performs comparisons between real
numbers is interpreted as a learning algorithm which uses “educated guesses” in order to
avoid non effective operations. This non-trivial behavior is not explicit in the classical proof,
but follows from the definition of ordering on Cauchy sequences by means of the interactive
realizability interpretation.
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In this chapter, our main goal is to showcase interactive realizability and the backtracking
algorithms it produces through a non-trivial example. For this reason, we chose to present
interactive realizability as a proof interpretation technique rather than as a realizability se-
mantics, in order to concentrate on the example and its computational interpretation without
being bogged down in technical details.
Note that interactive realizability is by no means the only approach to extract a computa-
tional interpretation from our proof. It should also be noted that while our proof is classical,
it can be seen that our statement admits an intuitionistic proof by the conservativity results
in [8].
5.2 Real Numbers
In this section we present our treatment of real numbers in Heyting Arithmetic.
There are many ways of encoding integer and rational numbers in HA and defining prim-
itive recursive operations and predicates on them. In the following we assume that we have
any such encoding and that we have decidable equality =Q and ordering <Q,≤Q and effective
operations +Q ·Q. We use the variables q and p for rationals.
5.2.1 Cauchy Sequences
There are many equivalent ways of defining the real numbers from the rational numbers.
The most known are the definition of the reals as equivalence classes of Cauchy sequences
and as Dedekind cuts. We follow the first approach.
A sequence of rationals r : N→ Q is a Cauchy sequence if the following holds:
∀k. ∃k0. ∀k1, k2. |r(k0 + k2) − r(k0 + k1)| < 12k . (5.1)
While this sequence approximates a real number, it can do so very slowly. By means of
classical reasoning, we can show that, from any Cauchy sequence, we can extract a fast-
converging monotone sub-sequence. For this reason, instead of general Cauchy sequences,
we can consider sequences of nested intervals with rational extremes whose length decreases
exponentially. An interval is determined by its extremes, so we represent a sequence of inter-
vals as a couple of sequences of rationals r−, r+, representing the lower and higher extremes
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of the intervals respectively. Then we require that r− is increasing and r+ is decreasing
(since the intervals are nested), that r−(k) is lesser than or equal to r+(k) (since they are the
lower and higher extremes of a same interval) and their difference is smaller than 2−k. More
precisely we say that r− and r+ represent a real number when they satisfy the following
condition, written as a Π01 formula:
∀k. (r−(k) ≤Q r+(k)) ∧ (r−(k) ≤Q r−(k + 1))∧
∧ (r+(k) ≥Q r+(k + 1)) ∧ (r+(k) −Q r−(k) ≤Q 2(−k)).
(5.2)
While the choice of the specific definition of real number is somewhat arbitrary, it is signif-
icant because it affects the logical properties (in particular the degree of undecidability) of
the ordering on the reals.
5.2.2 Order Predicate
Now we can define an “order predicate” OP(r, s, k), which can be thought of as a family of
strict partial orders on the real numbers indexed by natural number k. More precisely, it is
a formula that determines when the sequence of nested intervals r is strictly lesser than s, at
precision k. This happens when, at k, the higher extreme of an interval is strictly greater than
the lower extreme of the other. Then, from that point forward, the intervals will be forever
disjoint, since we they are nested sequences. This allows us to write the order predicate as
the formula:
OP(r, s, k) ≡ r+(k) <Q s−(k), (5.3)
which is decidable in r and s. Note that the definition of OP depends on that of real number.
If we had used the classical definition of Cauchy sequence the order predicate would be the
following Π01 formula:
OP′(r, s, k) ≡ ∀l. l ≥ k → r(l) <Q r(l). (5.4)
This is very significant for our purposes: the order predicate in (5.3) is decidable in r and s
(since the order on the rationals is), while in (5.4) it is only negatively decidable. This means
that we have an effective method to decide (5.4) when it is false, but not when it is true.
We need OP to satisfy some properties, written as rules in Figure 5.1. The OP-mon
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Figure 5.1: Rules for OP.
OP(r, s, k)
OP-mon OP(r, s, k + 1)
OP(r, r, k)
OP-irrefl ⊥
OP(r, s, k) OP(s, r, l)
OP-asym ⊥
OP(r, s, k) OP(s, t, l)
OP-trans OP(r, t,max(k, l))
rule expresses a monotonicity property: when an comparison at a given precision can dis-
tinguish two approximations, then comparisons at greater precision should too. The other
rules correspond to the standard axioms for a strict partial order: irreflexivity, asymmetry
and transitivity.
We verify that our definition of OP satisfies these properties.
Lemma 5. The order predicate OP defined by (5.3) satisfies the properties given in Fig-
ure 5.1.
Proof. We show that the properties follow directly from the definition of OP as (5.3) and
from our representation of real number as sequences of nested intervals (5.2).
Monotonicity We want to prove that
OP(r, s, k + 1) ≡ r+(k + 1) <Q s−(k + 1),
assuming that:
OP(r, s, k) ≡ r+(k) <Q s−(k).
This follows by applying the transitive property of the order on the rationals to the
following chain of inequalities:
r+(k + 1) ≤Q r+(k) since r+ is weakly decreasing,
<Q s−(k) by assumption,
≤Q s−(k + 1) since s+ is weakly increasing.
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Reflexivity We have to prove that
OP(r, r, k) ≡ r+(k) <Q r−(k),
yields a contradiction. This is a consequence of the fact that r−(k) and r+(k) are re-
spectively the lower and higher extremes of the same interval.
Asymmetry The OP-asym is actually derivable by monotonicity and transitivity:
OP(r, s, k) OP(s, r, l)
OP-trans OP(r, r, k)
OP-irrefl ⊥
Transitivity We have to prove that
OP(r, t, k) ≡ r+(k) <Q t−(max(k, l)),
follows from the assumptions:
OP(r, s, k) ≡ r+(k) <Q s−(k),
OP(s, t, l) ≡ s+(l) <Q t−(l).
We have two cases depending on whether max(k, l) is k or l. Since the two cases are
very similar, we only show the proof of the first. Thus we assume that max(k, l) = k,
which means that k ≥ k.
Again this follows applying the transitive property of the order on the rationals to the
following chain of inequalities:
r+(k) <Q s−(k) by the first assumption,
≤Q s+(k) since [s−(k), s−(k)] is an interval,
≤Q s+(l) since s+ is weakly decreasing and k ≥ l,
<Q t−(l) by the second assumption,
≤Q t−(k) since t− is weakly increasing and k ≥ l.
Thus, we have:
r+(k) <Q t−(max(k, l)). 
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5.2.3 Order and Equality on the Real Numbers
We can now defined order and equality on the reals. It is noteworthy that, while we define
order and equality in terms of OP, we never use the definition of OP itself in proving their
properties. We only need the properties of OP we proved in Lemma 5, thus we could proceed
in the same way even if we had defined OP differently, as long as Lemma 5 holds.
They are defined as follows:
r <R s ≡ ∃k. OP(r, s, k),
r ≤R s ≡ ∀k. ¬OP(s, r, k),
r ,R s ≡ ∃k. OP(r, s, k) ∨ OP(s, r, k),
r =R s ≡ ∀k. ¬OP(r, s, k) ∧ ¬OP(s, r, k).
Note that <R and ,R are Σ01 formulas and ≤R and =R are Π01 formulas. Moreover ≤R and =R
are the dual formulas of <R and ,R respectively, as defined in Section 2.1.6.
In order to prove the Least Element Lemma, which is needed in the proof of the Convex
Angle Theorem, we need to show some of the properties of the order ≤R.
Lemma 6 (Reflexivity, Semi-Transitivity and Totality of ≤R). The following properties hold:
r ≤R r (reflexivity)
r <R s ∧ s ≤R t → r ≤R t, (semi-transitivity)
r ≤R s ∨ s <R r. (totality)
Proof. The first two properties follows from the corresponding properties of OP. The last is
a classical tautology.
• In order to prove reflexivity we have to show that:
r ≤R r ≡ ∀k. ¬OP(r, r, k).
This follows by the OP-irrefl rule:
[OP(r, r, k)]α
OP-irrefl ⊥→ I α¬OP(r, r, k)∀I ∀k. ¬OP(r, r, k)
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• In order to prove this transitive property for mixed <R and ≤R we have to show that:
r ≤R t ≡ ∀k. ¬OP(t, r, k),
assuming that:
r <R s ≡ ∃k. OP(r, s, k),
s ≤R t ≡ ∀k. ¬OP(t, s, k).
This follows by means of the OP-trans rule:
∃k. OP(r, s, k)
∀k. ¬OP(t, s, k)∀E ¬OP(t, s,max(k, l))
[OP(t, r, k)]1 [OP(r, s, k¯)]2
OP-trans OP(t, s,max(k, l))→ E ⊥∃E 2⊥→ I 1¬OP(t, r, k)∀I ∀k. ¬OP(t, r, k)
• We have to show that:
r ≤R s ∨ s <R r ≡ ∀k. ¬OP(s, r, k) ∨ ∃k. OP(r, s, k),
which is an instance of EM1 when r and s denote recursive real numbers. 
The proof is constructive apart from the last point, where we show that totality is actually
an instance of EM1. Note that only the reflexivity property is stated in the standard way,
while transitivity and totality are written in non-standard forms. We chose these forms for
two reasons: they are easier to prove and they are the exact form we need in the proof of the
Least Element Lemma.
5.2.4 Variables for Real Numbers
Until now we have used r, s and t as metavariables for real numbers in an informal way.
However, since we are working in the first-order language of arithmetic, our variables range
only on natural numbers and not on functions. For our example we only need to address
a finite but arbitrary number of real numbers, that is, we only need a countable quantity of
them. Thus we can assume that we have a countable set of function symbols indexed by the
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natural numbers. These function symbols represent sequences of rational numbers satisfying
some notion of convergence.
In the case we are considering, where real numbers are represented with sequences of
nested intervals satisfying the convergence condition (5.2), we proceed as follows. We as-
sume that we have two sequences of indexed function symbols:
f +0 , . . . , f
+
n , . . . and f
−
0 , . . . , f
−
n , . . .
such that, for any index n, f +n and f
−
n satisfy the convergence condition (5.2). Then we can
formally define the order predicate as:
OP(i, j, k) ≡ f +i (k) <Q f −j (k),
where i and j are metavariables for arithmetic terms. Thus, when we write i < j, we mean
that i is smaller than s as indexes, that is, as natural numbers; on the other hand, when we
write i <R j, we mean that the real number indexed by i is smaller than the one indexed by
j.
However this notation, while formally correct, is hard to read: i ≤ j and i ≤R j look
confusingly similar while having unrelated meaning. In order to avoid confusion and hurting
the eyes of mathematicians, we sugar coat our syntax. We write ri instead of i when thinking
of i as a real number. For instance we write ri ≤R r j instead of i ≤R j. The last one is a much
more intuitive than the unsugared version.
5.2.5 The Least Element Lemma
Now we can reason about finite sets of real numbers as sets of indexes. In the next lemma, we
shall work with the sets of real numbers indexed by initial segments of the natural numbers.
We show the existence of a least element in each of these sets. The least element is actually a
minimum, that is, the unique least element of the set. However, in order to prove the Convex
Angle Theorem we do not need to show its uniqueness, just its existence.
Lemma 7 (Least Element). For any n, the real numbers r0, . . . , rn have a least element with
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respect to ≤R. More precisely: 1
∀n. ∃i ≤ n. ∀ j ≤ n. ri ≤R r j.
Proof. We proceed by induction on n.
Zero case In the base case n = 0 and we have to prove that:
∃i ≤ 0. ∀ j ≤ 0. ri ≤R r j.
Both i and j can only be 0; thus we just have to check the condition r0 ≤R r0, which
holds by reflexivity of ≤R.
Successor case In the inductive case we have to prove that:
∃i ≤ n + 1. ∀ j ≤ n + 1. ri ≤R r j,
from the inductive hypothesis:
∃i ≤ n. ∀ j ≤ n. ri ≤R r j.
By the inductive hypothesis, let i¯ ≤ n be the index of the least element in r0, . . . , rn.
By totality of ≤R we have two cases.
ri¯ ≤R rn+1 Then i¯ is the index of a least element in r0, . . . , rn+1, since ri¯ ≤R r j when
j = n + 1 (since we are considering this case) and when j ≤ n by inductive
hypothesis.
rn+1 <R ri¯ Then n + 1 is the index of a least element in r0, . . . , rn+1, since rn+1 ≤R r j
when j = n + 1 by reflexivity of ≤R and when j ≤ n by transitivity of <R and ≤R,
since:
rn+1 <R ri¯ ≤R r j
by inductive hypothesis. 
1 We use the standard compact notation for bounded quantifications:
∀ j ≤ n. A stands for ∀ j. j ≤ n→ A,
∃ j ≤ n. A stands for ∃ j. j ≤ n ∧ A.
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The proof looks constructive: its computational interpretation is the usual algorithm that
finds the least element in a vector, by a simple recursion or by looping on its elements. We
can write it as a recursive function “rmin” in Haskell:
Listing 5.1: The Least Element Program
rmin 0 = 0
rmin n = if rle (rmin (n-1)) n
then rmin (n-1)
else n
where “rle” is a boolean function that stands for ≤R, that is, it compares the reals indexed
by its arguments. The problem is that this is not a good program, because we are unable to
write “rle” as a terminating program. The closest approximation would be the following
unfounded recursion:
Listing 5.2: The Lesser or Equal Program
rle i j = rle_urec 0 i j
rle_urec k i j = if op j i k
then False
else rle_urec (k+1) i j
where “op” is a total boolean function that stands for the order predicate OP. We can assume
that “op” terminates for any input since OP is decidable. The problem is that ≤R is total
only classically. More precisely, totality is an instance of EM1 because ≤R is a Π01 formula
and thus negatively decidable. This can bee seen concretely in the program for “rle”:
“rle i j” only halts (returning “False”) if “op j i k” is true for some k, that is, if and
only if ri ≤ r j is false. On the other hand, when ri ≤ r j is true there is no such k and
the evaluation of “rle i j” will never halt. Note that “True” does not even occur in the
program, so its is clear that “rle i j” never returns “True”. This is the general behavior
of an algorithm that computes a negatively decidable predicate: when the predicate is false
it halt with the correct answer and when the predicate is true it does not halt.
For positively decidable predicates we have the dual behavior. For instance, in the case
of <R which is defined by a Σ01 formula and thus positively decidable, the decision procedure
can be written as:
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Listing 5.3: The Lesser Than Program
rlt i j = rlt_urec 0 i j
rlt_urec k i j = if op i j k
then True
else rlt_urec (k+1) i j
The program is very similar to the previous one, the only noteworthy changes are the order
of the argument given to “op” and the fact that the only possible return value is “True”
instead of “False”. It only halts (returning “True”) if “op i j k” is true for some k, that
is, when ri ≤ r j is true.
Remark 3. Note how Program 5.1 is much shorter than the proof of the Least Element
Lemma. This difference would be even bigger if the proof was written in a completely formal
language, for instance in a proof assistant. The reason for this discrepancy is that the proof
contains both the algorithm written in Program 5.1 and the evidence for the correctness of
the algorithm. This last part is missing from Program 5.1, thus explaining the difference in
length.
5.3 The Interactive Interpretation of the Least Element Lemma
We have seen why the naive way of extracting a program from proofs fails in the case of
the Least Element Lemma. Now we give the interactive interpretation of the Least Element
Lemma. Since we are working in HA + EM1, any proof can be thought of as a construc-
tive proof with open assumptions, that are the instances of EM1 that are used in the proof.
The interactive realizability interpretation follows the standard BHK interpretation for the
constructive parts, so we will concentrate on the interpretation of the EM1 instances.
The only instances of EM1 in the proof are those used to deduce the totality property:
ri ≤R r j ∨ r j <R ri. (5.5)
The left disjunct, which we call the universal disjunct, is Π01 and negatively decidable, while
the right one, the existential disjunct is Σ01 and positively decidable. Moreover universal
disjunct and negation of the existential disjunct are classically equivalent. We say that a
formula is concrete when it is closed and all its arithmetical terms are normal.
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In order to motivate the interactive realizability interpretation we show why a naive at-
tempt to give a computational behavior an EM1 instance fails. This can be seen concretely,
by recalling the semi-effective procedures Programs 5.2 and 5.3 that decide the disjuncts of
the instances of EM1 representing the totality, but the general argument is the same. The
universal disjunct is negatively decidable, that is, its deciding program halts if and only if
it is false; the existential disjunct is positively decidable, that is, its deciding program halts
if and only if it is true. What happens if we run these two decision programs in parallel?
Can one give the answer whenever the other fails? In recursion theory, this method is used
for instance to prove that if the complement of a recursively enumerable set is recursively
enumerable then the set is recursive. Unfortunately this does not work in our case. We have
two scenarios:
• If the existential disjunct is true, its decision procedure halts and returns true. Since
in this case the universal disjunct is false, its decision procedure also halts and returns
false.
• If the universal disjunct is true, its decision procedure does not halt. Since in this case
the existential disjunct is false, its decision procedure does not halt either.
The problem lies in the fact that the disjuncts are dual and their decision procedures describe
basically the same algorithm with minor variations. In particular they halt or fail to halt
on the same inputs. This is evident when considering the programs given in Programs 5.2
and 5.3.
Interactive realizability proposes a way to side-step the problem evidenced above. This
is possible since it is not true that the computational interpretation of a proof using instances
of EM1 necessarily needs to decide these instances. Consider the case of totality of the order
on the real numbers. The universal disjunct is:
ri ≤R r j ≡ ∀k. ¬OP(r j, ri, k).
Being an universally quantified statement, it proves infinite instances ¬OP(r j, ri, k), one for
each natural number k. A proof that uses totality may need all this infinite information or
(for example, when proving a simply existential statement) may only need a finite quantity
of these instances. In the second case, we can avoid the problem of effectively deciding the
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EM1 instance. We only need to decide those instances that are actually used in the proof.
This is possible, since each instance is decidable (being a quantifier free formula) and we
assumed there is a finite quantity of them. Interactive realizability takes advantage of this
fact and gives a procedure to determine which instances of the universal disjunct are needed
and to iteratively decide them.
The interactive interpretation is a “relaxation” of the BHK interpretation. In the BHK
interpretation the decision of a disjunction effectively selects a true disjunct, in the interactive
case instead of a decision we have a sort of “educated guess”. Therefore, while EM1 cannot
be realized by the BHK interpretation since there is no effective procedure to decide it, the
interactive interpretation can because it yields a weaker semantics, which produces a sure
result only when the goal is simply existential.
Interactive realizability revolves around the concept of knowledge state. A knowledge
state, or simply state, is a finite object that stores information about the EM1 instances we
use in the proof. The purpose of this information is help us decide the EM1 instances, that
is, help us in choosing which disjunct holds. Moreover, whenever the state chooses the
existential disjunct, it should also produce a witness, like in the BHK interpretation.
We can represent a state as a finite partial function2 that maps a concrete instance of
EM1 into a witness of its existential disjunct. Such a function decides or guesses a concrete
instance A of EM1: if it is undefined on A, then we choose the universal disjunct; if it is
defined we chose the existential disjunct with the returned witness. We are only interested to
the instances appearing in the proof, namely, those of the form (5.5) when i, j are numerals.
Thus an instance is determined by two natural numbers; since witnesses are natural numbers
too, a state can be concretely defined as a finite partial function from N × N to N.
For instance, consider the case of the EM1 instances used in the proof of the Least Ele-
ment Lemma. When we have to decide (5.5), we check the state on the pair (i, j). At first,
let us assume that the state is undefined on (i, j). This means we have no knowledge about
the universal disjunct ri ≤R r j. Since we cannot effectively check that the universal disjunct
holds, we make an educated guess and assume that ri ≤R r j is true. Clearly this assumption
could very well be wrong, which may or may not become apparent later in the proof. Keep-
ing track of this assumption, we carry on with the proof. Every time we use this assumption
2By finite partial function, we mean a partial function whose domain (the set of elements where it is defined)
is finite.
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to prove a decidable instance of its we check if the instance holds. More concretely, if later
in the proof we use the assumption ri ≤R r j to deduce that ¬OP( j, i, k) for some k, we check
that ¬OP( j, i, k) holds. If this is the case, we carry on with the proof: ri ≤R r j could still
be false, but at least the particular instance we are using is true. If this is not the case, we
have found a counterexample to the assumption ri ≤R r j: being negatively decidable, the
counterexample is enough to effectively decide that it is false. Therefore we stop following
the proof because we have chosen the wrong disjunct in the EM1 instance (5.5).
Moreover, a counterexample to ri ≤R r j is a natural number k such that OP( j, i, k).
Therefore k is a witness for the existential disjunct r j <R ri. We can use this new knowledge
to add (i, j) to the domain of the state with value k. Remember that we assumed the state to
be undefined on (i, j), which is why we assumed the universal disjunct to be true in the first
place.
At this point, we forget what we did after guessing (wrongly) that the universal disjunct
was true and start again, More precisely, we need to backtrack to a computation state before
we decided the EM1 instance in question and repeat our decision with the extended state.
Since the extended state is defined on (i, j) and yields k, this time we decide the EM1 instance
differently: we choose the existential disjunct r j <R ri with k as witness. Now we are sure
that our choice is the correct one and not a guess, since we have effectively decided that the
existential disjunct holds (we can since it is positively decidable).
The exact point we need to backtrack to is not relevant, as long as it is before the decision
of the EM1 instance. A simple choice would be the very beginning, in which case we do not
need to keep track of where we decided the EM1 instance. A more efficient choice is right
before the decision point, so that we do not need to repeat the computations before it, which
do not change.
In order for the interactive interpretation to produce correct results, we need to assume
that the state is sound, that is, when it is defined, the witness it yields is actually a witness.
More formally, a state s is sound if, for any pair (i, j), we have that OP( j, i, s(i, j)) holds. This
assumption is not problematic: the empty state, namely the state that is always undefined,
satisfies it vacuously. Moreover, note that in the interactive interpretation we outlined above,
we only extend a state with an actual witness. In other words, the extension preserves the
soundness property.
To summarize, the general procedure is the following:
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1. we start from any sound state (usually the empty state),
2. we follow the proof choosing any EM1 instance according to the state,
3. if we discover that we wrongly assumed the universal disjunct of an EM1 instance:
(a) we extend the state with the counterexample we found,
(b) we backtrack to a point before the EM1 instance we guessed wrong,
(c) we proceed as in step 2,
4. if we never discover that we wrongly assumed an universal disjunct we carry on until
the end of the proof and we are done.
Interactive realizability can be thought as a “smart”, albeit “partial”, decision algorithm
for negatively decidable statements. This can be seen comparing it with the naive algorithm
given in Program 5.2. It is partial because a real decision is impossible, so it only considers
a finite number of instances, unlike the unbounded recursion employed by Program 5.2. It
is smart because it does not perform a blind search, trying in order all the natural numbers.
Instead it uses the proof itself to find the counterexamples. There is a reasonable expectation
that the ideas underlying the proof provide a more focused way of selecting counterexamples
than a blind search (this of course depends on the proof itself).
Until now we considered a single instance of the EM1 axiom, but little changes if there is
more than one. We will return to this point later. In the proof of the Least Element Lemma,
one instance of EM1 is used for each inductive step in the proof. When we interpret the
proof with the empty state, for each of these instances we assume that the universal disjunct
holds. Therefore the proof is interpreted as follows. In the base step we choose r0. In the
first inductive step, we have to decide the EM1 instance:
r0 ≤R r1 ∨ r1 <R r0.
Since the state is empty, we assume that r0 ≤R r1. Thus we keep r0 as the least element of
r0, r1. In the second inductive step, we have to decide the EM1 instance:
r0 ≤R r2 ∨ r2 <R r0.
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Since the state is empty, we again assume that r0 ≤R r2. Thus we keep r0 as the least element
of r0, r1, r2. At the end of the proof, we have assumed the following universal disjuncts:
r0 ≤R r1, r0 ≤R r2, . . . , r0 ≤R rn. (5.6)
Under these assumptions, we have found that the least element is r0. Rather disappointing,
isn’t it?
The reason for this is that the universal disjuncts ri ≤R r j are never instanced, so we have
neither opportunity or reason to falsify one of them. However this may change if the Least
Element Lemma is used inside a bigger proof. This will happen later in the proof of the
Convex Angle Theorem. In this case the outer proof might instance these assumptions and
discover them wrong, in which case we have to backtrack to the proof of the Least Element
Lemma.
Let us see how the Least Element Lemma behaves when its conclusion is used to deduce
decidable instances. Assume that n = 5. If the state is empty, then the Least Element Lemma
tells us that r0 is a least element. This means that r0 ≤R ri for any i. Imagine that we use
the Least Element Lemma in a bigger proof to prove that r0 ≤R r3. This is one of the EM1
instances we assumed in (5.6). Moreover, imagine that, using this assumption, we discover
that r0 ≤R r3 does not hold at precision 33. Then we have to extend the domain of the state
to (0, 3) with value 33. At this point we backtrack, say at the beginning of the proof of the
Least Element Lemma.
We again start from r0 and proceed like before. The first and second inductive steps
again select r0 as the least element, assuming that r0 ≤R r1 and r0 ≤R r2. Things change
at the third inductive step when we have to decide r0 ≤R r3 ∨ r3 <R r0. Since know the
state has a relevant witness, this time we choose the existential disjunct with witness 33,
thus selecting r3 as the new least element. In the next inductive steps we again assume the
universal disjuncts r3 ≤R r4 and r3 ≤R r5, since the state has no information on them. Thus
our the least element is r3. A summary of our decisions is represented in Figure 5.2. Imagine
that we were to discover a counterexample to r3 ≤R r2, say at precision 25. This statement is
not one of the universal disjuncts that we assumed. By looking at the proof or at Figure 5.2,
we can see that it has been deduced by the semi-transitivity property from r3 <R r0 and
r0 ≤R r2. The first is the existential disjunct for which we found a witness, so we are sure
that it holds. Thus the the wrong assumption is r0 ≤R r2. By checking the proof of semi-
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Figure 5.2: A graph representing the result of the least element computation. Full arrows repre-
sent information provided by the state, dotted arrows “guessed” information the state knows nothing
about.
r3
r0
r4
r5
r1
r2
transitivity we can see that the counterexample for r0 ≤R r2 is max(25, 33), thus 33 again.
We extend the state accordingly and repeat the least element computation, which results in
new least element r2. In Figure 5.3 we summarize the iterations we saw until now and add
some more, as an example.
5.3.1 Backtracking, Termination and Complexity
In the iterations listed in Figure 5.3, we compute the following sequence of least element
candidates:
r0, r3, r2, r3, r1, r4.
The fact that r3 appears two times may cause doubts regarding the termination of the back-
tracking algorithm. The termination of the backtracking algorithms in interactive realizabil-
ity has been proven in general, see Theorem 2.15 in [2].
In this particular case we can understand why r3 is computed two times by taking a
closer look at the tree of the possible computations of the least element, which is shown in
Figure 5.4. For reasons of space, we only show the tree for n = 3, which is enough to see
what happens up to the fifth iteration in Figure 5.3. We can see that the first five iterations
in Figure 5.3 correspond to the computation paths ending with the first five leaves from the
left in Figure 5.4, in order.
Moreover, from the computation tree we can see that we never perform the same compu-
tation more than once. Indeed, assume we have just followed a particular computation path.
When we backtrack we increment the state adding a witness of one of the EM1 instances
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Figure 5.3: An example of evaluations of the interactive interpretation of the Least Element Lemma
with state extensions.
Iter State Least element Used Deducedfrom Discovered
1st r0 r1,...,5 r0 ≤R r3 r0 ≤R r3 r3 <R r0
2nd r3 <R r0 r3
r0 r1,2
r4,5
r3 ≤R r2 r3 <R r0r0 ≤R r2 r2 <R r0
3rd r2 <R r0r3 <R r0 r2
r0 r1
r3,4,5
r2 ≤R r3 r2 ≤R r3 r3 <R r2
4th
r2 <R r0
r3 <R r0
r3 <R r2
r3
r2 r0 r1
r4,5
r3 ≤R r1
r3 <R r2
r2 <R r0
r0 ≤R r1
r1 <R r0
5th
r1 <R r0
r2 <R r0
r3 <R r0
r4 <R r2
r1
r0
r2,3,4,5
r1 ≤R r4 r1 ≤R r4 r4 <R r1
6th
r1 <R r0
r2 <R r0
r3 <R r0
r4 <R r2
r4 <R r1
r4
r1
r0
r2,3r5
. . . . . . . . .
Iter: the iteration represented by the current row; State: the existential disjuncts witnessed by the
state; Least element: the least element yielded by the Least Element Lemma; Used: a falsifiable
consequence of the Least Element Lemma used in the proof; Deduced from: what we deduced the
falsifiable consequence from; Discovered: the existential assumption we found a witness of.
we encountered along the path, an instance we did not have a witness for. This means that
in the next computation, when we arrive at the node corresponding to that EM1 instance,
instead of taking the left path as we did previously (since the state did not have a witness
for that instance), we take the right path, because this time we do have a witness (since we
just extended the state with it). Therefore, each time we backtrack, the computation path
ends with a leaf that is more to the right in Figure 5.4. This gives a bound to the number of
backtrackings, namely 2n − 1.
This is very different from what one could expect by a superficial look at the proof of
the Least Element Lemma. Indeed, if we ignore the undecidability of the order on the reals,
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Figure 5.4: The computation tree of the least element for n = 3
.
r0
r0
r0 ≤R r3
r3
r3 <R r0
r0
r0 ≤R r2
r2
r2 ≤R r3
r3
r3 <R r2
r2
r2 <R r0
r0
r0 ≤R r1
r1
r1 ≤R r3
r3
r3 <R r1
r1
r1 ≤R r2
r2
r2 ≤R r3
r3
r3 <R r2
r2
r2 <R r1
r1
r1 <R r0
Each path represents a possible computation, proceeding from root to leaf, where non-leaf nodes are
the current least element candidates and the leaf is the final result. Each branching corresponds to
an EM1 instance, where the left branch is taken when we guess that the universal disjunct holds for
lack of information and the right branch is taken when the state contains the relevant witness.
this simple and very natural proof seems to be quite efficient, since its complexity is linear
in n. However, its interactive interpretation has exponential complexity. This can be seen in
the computation tree too: a single computation correspond to a path and paths have length
n. On the other hand, since we have backtracking, in the worst case we may have to perform
every possible computation. Naturally, the real situation is different since the order on the
reals is undecidable and thus an actual comparison is impossible.
Moreover, while in the worst case the interactive interpretation needs a time that is expo-
nential in n, in general it is hard to estimate the amount of backtracking that will be actually
performed, for two different reasons.
• The first one is that the actual order of r0, . . . , rn affects heavily the operation of the
algorithm. Indeed, assume that r0 is the least element: the interactive interpretation
only performs n dummy comparisons and immediately returns a least element candi-
date that, in this case, is the actual least element, so no backtracking can ensue later.
• The second reason is that the backtracking is controlled by how the least element can-
didate returned by the interactive interpretation is used. It is possible for the interactive
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interpretation to return a candidate that is not a least element, but such that its use in an
outer proof is does not cause backtracking. In other words, we only need to compute
a least element candidate that is good enough instead of the correct one and this can
translate to a faster computation, again depending on the situation.
In a sense, the second reason explains also how the interactive interpretation is effective even
if an certainly correct least element cannot be found effectively.
5.3.2 The Whole Proof Is Relevant
In Remark 3, we said that proofs contains both an algorithm (which may be trivial if no
information is being computed) and the proof of its correctness. This is also the case when
we consider the computational content of a proof in the BHK interpretation: we can separate
the part that computes values and such (the informative computation) from the part that
computes the evidence showing that the values are correct (the correctness computation).
The correctness computation does not affect the result of the informative computation and
can be safely discarded when we are only interested in algorithm extraction.
This is not the case for the computational content in the interactive interpretation. Here
the correctness part of the computation affects the backtracking, which affects the state,
which in turn affects the informative part of computation and thus the computed values.
Therefore, in interactive realizability both parts of the proof interact to produce the final
result.
We have already seen an example of this interaction. In the second iteration we chose r3
as the least element and then we tried to instance r3 ≤R r2. Then we realized that r3 ≤R r2 is
false and that we had made a wrong assumption somewhere. However r3 ≤R r2 is not one of
the universal disjunct which we assumed by lack of information. Therefore we have to look
at the proof in order to find out which universal disjuncts we needed to deduce r3 ≤R r2 and
to compute the witness which we need to extend the state. This shows that in the interactive
interpretation we cannot forget how we proved the correctness of our computations.
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5.4 The Real Plane
In this section we introduce the real plane, points, lines and some relations between them.
We use elementary analytic geometry: points are represented by coordinates, lines by equa-
tions and proofs are mostly computations with real numbers.
We represent a point as a pair of real numbers, its coordinates. Formally we can say that
a point is just a natural number i and that there is a primitive recursive function mapping in-
dexes into pairs of real numbers. As we did for real numbers, in order to improve readability
we add some sugar to the notation and use the metavariables P,Q,R, S for arithmetic terms
used as indexes of points. When we use the index of a point both as a number and as a point,
we write it as i in the first case and as Pi in the second. We write the coordinates of a point
P as (xP, yP) and of a point Pi as (xi, yi).
A line passing through two points PQ is written as PQ. The order of the points induces
an orientation on the line.
Before proceeding we need to introduce further infrastructure for the real numbers.
5.4.1 Operations on Real Numbers
Any rational number q can be embedded in our coding of the real numbers: indeed we can
represent q as a real number by taking the nested interval sequence with the lower and higher
extremes constantly equal to q. In particular we assume that there is an index 0R such that
f + and f − are constantly zero.
We need to introduce the addition, subtraction and multiplication operations on the reals.
In order to do this formally, we need to assume that for each pair of indexes i and j of real
numbers, there is an index k which correspond to the nested interval sequence that is the
result of their sum, difference or product. Again, instead of writing the index k, we use the
usual syntax ri +R r j for the sum, ri −R r j for the difference and ri ·R r j for the product.
Now we define the actual sequences that represent the result of each operation and show
that they satisfy the real number condition (5.2).
We define addition on the nested interval sequences as:
(ri +R r j)+(k) ≡ r+i (k + 1) +Q r+j (k + 1),
(ri +R r j)−(k) ≡ r−i (k + 1) +Q r−j (k + 1).
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It is immediate to check that the the sequences are a sequence of nested intervals; we only
check that they converge with the required speed, which is the condition that requires the
use of k + 1 in the previous definition:
(ri +R r j)+(k) −Q (ri +R r j)−(k) =Q
=Q (r+i (k + 1) +Q r
+
j (k + 1)) −Q (r−i (k + 1) +Q r−j (k + 1)) =Q
=Q (r+i (k + 1) −Q r−i (k + 1)) +Q (r+j (k + 1) −Q r−j (k + 1)) ≤Q
≤Q 2−k+1 +Q 2−k+1 =Q 2−k.
We can define the difference by combining the sum and the opposite, which is defined as:
(−r)+(k) ≡ −Qr−(k),
(−r)−(k) ≡ −Qr+(k).
Defining the product is slightly more complicated. For simplicity we only show the case
when the extreme of the intervals are always positive.
So let r+i , r
−
i , r
+
j and r
−
j be sequences of positive rational numbers. We define their
product as:
(ri ·R r j)+(k) ≡ r+i (l) ·Q r+j (l),
(ri ·R r j)−(k) ≡ r−i (l) ·Q r−j (l),
where l depends on k. In order to determine l we consider the convergence condition and
look for the smallest l that satisfies it:
(ri ·R r j)+(k) −Q (ri ·R r j)−(k) ≤Q 2−k.
We begin by finding a simple upper bound for the left-hand side:
(ri ·R r j)+(k) −Q (ri ·R r j)−(k) =Q
=Q r+i (l) ·Q r+j (l) −Q r−i (l) ·Q r−j (l) =Q
=Q r+i (l) ·Q r+j (l) −Q r−i (l) ·Q r−j (l) −Q r+i (l) ·Q r−j (l) +Q r+i (l) ·Q r−j (l) =Q
=Q r+i (l) ·Q (r+j (l) −Q r−j (l)) +Q r−j (l) ·Q (r+j (l) −Q r−j (l)) ≤Q
≤Q r+i (l)2−l +Q r−j (l)2−l =Q (r+i (l) +Q r−j (l))2−l.
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Thus the convergence condition is satisfied when:
(r+i (l) +Q r
−
j (l))2
−l ≤Q 2−k.
We define k as the smallest natural number satisfying the previous inequality.
5.4.2 The Left and Right Predicates
In order to write the formal statement of the Convex Angle Theorem, we need a way to
determine the position of a point with respect to a line.
First of all consider two points P and Q. We can write the equation that a point R has to
satisfy to be on the line going through them:
(xQ − xP)(yR − yP) − (xR − xP)(yQ − yP) =R 0R. (5.7)
If the left-hand side is zero then R is on the same line with P and Q. When left-hand side is
not zero, we can use its sign to distinguish which side of PQ R is on. We call these sides left
and right. We write left(P,Q,R) (resp. right(P,Q,R)) and we say that R is to the left (resp.
right) of the line passing through the points P and Q when
left(P,Q,R) ≡ (xQ − xP)(yR − yP) − (xR − xP)(yQ − yP) >R 0R,
right(P,Q,R) ≡ (xQ − xP)(yR − yP) − (xR − xP)(yQ − yP) <R 0R,
as seen in Figure 5.5. A few remarks on this definition:
• left and right are positively decidable, since they are defined by means of <R;
• since the definitions of left and right are almost the same and only the direction of the
inequality changes, R is to the left of PQ if and only if Q is to the right of PQ;
• the left side of PQ corresponds to the right side of QP and the other way around, so
the order of the points is significant;
• the left-hand side of (5.7) can also be thought as the scalar product of (−(yQ−yP), xQ−
xP), the orthogonal of the vector from P to Q, and (xR − xP, yR − yP), the vector from
P to R.
We say that P is above Q if yP ≥R yQ and that R is below Q when yR ≤R yQ.
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Figure 5.5: R is to the left of PQ.
P
Q
Left
Right
R
5.5 The Geometric Part of the Proof
Now we are ready to present the rest of the proof of the main statement. We divide the proof
in two parts, the first given as a lemma. Since these proofs are more complex, for reason of
readability and space we will not be as formal as we have we have been until now.
From this point onward we assume that no three points are on the same line, formally:
∀P,Q,R. left(P,Q,R) ∨ right(P,Q,R). (5.8)
This a strong assumption, even more so because we require this to hold constructively: since
left and right are Σ01 formulas defined with ≤R, we assume that we have an effective map
that given three points yields the precision we need to reach in order to check that R is not
on the line PQ. In other words, we are assuming that we have a procedure that effectively
decides instances of the left and right predicates. The effective computation we extract uses
this procedure as a parameter.
A further consequence is that all points must be distinct: when xP =R xQ and yP =R yQ,
the left-hand side in (5.7) is always zero for any R.
In the next lemma the points Q0,Q1,Q2 are three generic points, that is, Qi is not nec-
essarily the point indexed by the natural number i. Moreover we assume that the index i in
Qi is interpreted up to congruence modulo 3 and thus always falls in {0, 1, 2}. For instance,
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when we write Q4, we actually mean Q1. We write the coordinates of Qi as (xi, yi), with the
same conventions for the index. We prove that when three points are one to the left of the
other with respect to a central one, one of them is necessarily lower than the central point,
as shown in Figure 5.6.
Lemma 8 (Three points). Assume (5.8) and let P,Q0,Q1 and Q2 be four points in the real
plane such that Qi+1 is to the left (resp. right) of PQi for any i < 3. Then at least one of
Q0,Q1,Q2 is strictly below P. Formally:
∀P,Q0,Q1,Q2. (∀i < 3. left(P,Qi,Qi+1))→ ∃i < 3. yi <R yP.
Figure 5.6: The three points lemma when Q2 is the point below P.
P
Q0Q1
Q2
Classical proof. Without loss of generality we can assume that the coordinates of P are
(0R, 0R). Then, unfolding the definition of left, the hypothesis on the points can be written
as:
∀i < 3. xiyi+1 − xi+1yi >R 0R,
The first step is showing that there at least two points whose vertical coordinate is not zero.
This follows from the fact that if, for some i < 3, yi = 0R then yi+1 , 0R and yi−1 , 0R. This
is the case since if yi = 0R then
xi−1yi − xiyi−1 = −xiyi−1 >R 0R,
xiyi+1 − xi+1yi = xiyi+1 >R 0R,
and then yi+1 , 0R and yi−1 , 0R. Then we can assume that yi+1 and yi−1 are not zero. If
either of them is negative we can conclude.
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Otherwise they are both positive. We show that, in this case, yi is negative. By hypothesis
we know that:
xi−1yi − xiyi−1 >R 0R,
xiyi+1 − xi+1yi >R 0R.
Since yi+1 and yi−1 are positive we can multiply the previous inequalities:
yi+1(xi−1yi − xiyi−1) >R 0R,
yi−1(xiyi+1 − xi+1yi) >R 0R.
By adding them together we get:
yi(xi−1yi+1 − xi+1yi−1) > 0.
Since the term in parenthesis is negative by hypothesis, yi must be too. Since Q, R and S are
to the right of each other with respect to P if and only if S , R and Q are to the left of each
other with respect to P, the proof for right is basically the same. 
The previous proof can be made constructive. Since the proofs are very similar, we give
the intuitionistic proof without explaining the how we obtained it from the classical one. The
main difference is that, in the intuitionistic proof, we work directly on the rational intervals
approximating the coordinates of the points and thus we use rational arithmetic which is
decidable. For any precisionk, let Xi(k) and Yi(k) be the closed rational intervals [x−i (k), x
+
i ]
and [y−i (k), y
+
i ] respectively. We write qi ∈ Xi(k) as a compact notation for x−i ≤Q xi ∧ xi ≤Q
x+i .
Intuitionistic proof. Without loss of generality we can assume that the coordinates of P are
(0R, 0R). Then, unfolding the definition of left, the hypothesis on the points can be written
as:
∀i < 3. xiyi+1 − xi+1yi >R 0R.
By unfolding the definition of real numbers as sequences of nested intervals and these of the
operations on real numbers, we can compute some precision k such that:
∀i < 3. ∀qi ∈ Xi(k), yi ∈ Yi(k), qi+1 ∈ Xi+1(k), yi+1 ∈ Yi+1(k). qiyi+1 − qi+1yi >Q 0Q. (5.9)
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The first step is showing that there at least two points whose vertical coordinate is not zero.
In order to show this, assume that for some i < 3 we have 0Q ∈ Yi(k). Then we can take
pi = 0Q in (5.9), for i − 1 and i:
∀qi−1 ∈ Xi−1(k), qi ∈ Xi(k), pi−1 ∈ Yi−1(k). qi−1 pi − qi pi−1 = −qi pi−1 >Q 0Q,
∀qi ∈ Xi(k), qi+1 ∈ Xi+1(k), pi+1 ∈ Yi+1(k). qi−1 pi − qi pi−1qi pi+1 − qi+1 pi = qi pi+1 >Q 0Q.
Therefore, for j ∈ {i − 1, i + 1}, 0Q < Y j(k) and, since Y j(k) is an interval, it must be either
completely positive or completely negative, namely, either x−j >Q 0Q or x
+
j <Q 0Q. If either
one is completely negative then we have the conclusion.
Otherwise they are both completely positive and we show that, in this case, Yi(k) is
completely negative. For all q j ∈ X j(k) and all p j ∈ Y j(k) with j ∈ {0, 1, 2}; we know by
hypothesis that:
qi−1 pi − qi pi−1 >Q 0Q,
qi pi+1 − qi+1 pi >Q 0Q.
Since pi+1 and pi−1 are positive we can multiply the previous inequalities:
pi+1(qi−1 pi − qi pi−1) >Q 0Q,
pi−1(qi pi+1 − qi+1 pi) >Q 0Q.
By adding them together we get:
pi(qi−1 pi+1 − qi+1 pi−1) >Q 0Q.
Since the term in parenthesis is negative by hypothesis, pi must be too, for all pi ∈ Yi.
Since Q, R and S are to the right of each other with respect to P if and only if S , R and
Q are to the left of each other with respect to P, the proof for right is basically the same. 
We can now prove the main statement.
Theorem 6 (Convex Angle). Assume (5.8). For any n ≥ 2, we can select three points P, Q
and R from {P0, . . . , Pn} such that all the remaining points fall in the angle Q̂PR, that is, all
points are to the left of PQ and to the right of PR.
∀n ≥ 2. ∃i, j, k ≤ n. ∀l ≤ n. l , i∧ (l , j→ left(Pi, P j, Pl))∧ (l , k → right(Pi, Pk, Pl)).
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Classical proof. Let P be the point with the least vertical coordinate and choose other two
points Q′ and R′, which are our candidates for Q and R respectively. We want all points
except P to be to the left of PQ and to the right of PR. If Q′ is to the left of PR′, we swap
Q′ and R′. Thus we know that Q′ is to the right of PR′ and R′ is to the left of PQ′.
Now consider any point S except P, Q′ and R′. We have four cases:
• If S is to the left of PQ′ and if it is to the right of PR′, then we keep Q′ and R′ as
candidates for Q and R.
• If S is to the right of PQ′, then we choose S as the new candidate for Q.
P
Q′R′
S
S ′
Clearly Q′ is to the left of PS . Moreover, any other point S ′, which we already
checked to be to the left of PQ′, is to the left of PS too. This is a consequence of (5.8)
and Lemma 8.
Indeed, from (5.8), we know that S ′ is either to the left or to the right of PS . We
already know that S is to the right of PQ′ and Q′ is to the right of PS ′. If S ′ were
to the right of PS , then by Lemma 8, one of Q′, S or S ′ would have be strictly lower
than P which would be a contradiction, since P is the lowest point. Thus S ′ is to the
left of PS .
• Symmetrically, if S is to the left of PR′, then we choose S as the new candidate for R.
• We shot that S cannot be to the right of PQ′ and to the left of PR′:
P
Q′R
′
S
If this were the case, Q′ would be to the left of PS and S would be to the left of PR′.
Since we know that R′ is to the left of PQ′, by Lemma 8, one of S , Q′ or R′ would be
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strictly lower than P. This is a contradiction, since P is the lowest point by the Least
Element Lemma.
We repeat this procedure for all the points except P, Q′ and R′ and we find the required
points Q and R. 
For convenience we have written the proof as an iterative algorithm. The proof is actually
by induction on a slightly stronger version of the final statement, that adds the requirement
for P to be lower than all the other points.
5.6 The Interactive Interpretation
Before studying the interactive interpretation of the whole proof of the Convex Angle The-
orem along with its lemmas, we need understand their computational significance. Thus we
stop for a moment and recall some general considerations on the computational meaning of
formulas in the BHK interpretation and, more specifically, in the Curry-Howard correspon-
dence.
As a consequence of the proof-as-programs and formulas-as-types interpretation, the
conclusion of a proof (that is, the statement it proves) can be thought of as the specification
of the program representing the proof.
5.6.1 Subroutines, arguments and effective computations
In order to understand how the interactive interpretation works, it is important to distinguish
computations that can be carried out effectively from those that cannot. Consider a proof of
a statement of the form:
∀x. ∃y. A. (5.10)
If we read the previous formula as a specification, it calls for a program that describes a
function, a subroutine. It takes a natural number as an argument named x and returns a
pair containing a natural number y and a program/proof that y satisfies A. More generally,
statements in mathematics have the following form:
∀x1, . . . , xn. A1 ∧ · · · ∧ Am → A.
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This can be again seen as the specification of a subroutine, taking n natural numbers and m
programs as arguments. From this point of view, it becomes clear that such a program is
not computing anything, at least in itself. An effective computation can only start once the
subroutine is applied to an argument.
All of our theorems begin with universal quantifications and implications, that is, they
are specification for programs that code functions with arguments. Thus, in order to have an
actual computation we have to provide the program with the required arguments.
5.6.2 The Interactive Interpretation of the Whole Proof
We can now explain the interactive interpretation of the whole proof, composed of the two
lemmas and the final algorithmic proof. We focus on the interaction between these parts
without analyzing each part in detail as we have done for the Least Element Lemma.
We start by considering the statement of the Convex Angle Theorem. Assume that we are
given a natural number n. In the proof we work with the first n+1 points of the enumeration.
The proof is an iterative procedure to select P, Q and R satisfying the following bounding
condition:
∀l ≤ n. l , i ∧ (l , j→ left(Pi, P j, Pl)) ∧ (l , k → right(Pi, Pk, Pl)). (5.11)
The bounding condition specifies an informative computation, since left and right are defined
by means of <R, which is an existential quantification. Thus its proofs computes some
witnesses, namely the precision of the comparisons we need to check that the bounding
condition holds. While are mainly interested in the choice of the points P,Q and R and
not in the information needed to prove the bounding condition itself, the precision of the
computation provided by (5.11) is actually used in interactive interpretation since it can
cause backtracking.
We claim that this bounding condition specifies an effective computation. First of all,
the outer universal quantification is bounded, thus, in order to compute the condition, we
have to compute the body of the quantification n + 1 times. The same holds for the conjunc-
tions. Thus the effectiveness of the whole condition follows from the effectiveness of the
conjuncts. The implications are effective: their only argument, the proof of the antecedent,
is arithmetical atomic, hence irrelevant, thus the computations they specify must be con-
stant functions. Therefore, we can effectively compute them by applying them to any single
114 Chapter 5. Interpreting a Geometric Example with Interactive Realizability
argument. Finally their consequents specify effective computations, thanks to (5.8), the as-
sumption that no three points are on the same line. Thus, proofs of the bounding condition
describe effective computations.
Now we can start following the proof. In the beginning, the lowest point P is selected
using the Least Element Lemma on the vertical coordinate. Consider the statement of the
Least Element Lemma:
∀n. ∃i ≤ n. ∀ j ≤ n. ri ≤R r j.
As a specification, it calls for a program that, given n, yields the value i and the correctness
computation that checks that i is the least element. Since the correctness computation cannot
be carried out effectively (it is negatively decidable), the interactive interpretation computes
a trivial least element the first time. If later in the proof we happen to partially compute the
correctness computation, then we may discover new information and backtrack again to the
least element computation. Since the Least Element Lemma does not necessarily return a
least element, but only a least element candidate, P is not the lowest point either, but just a
lowest point candidate.
The function of Lemma 8 is to prove that some point is strictly lower than P, thus pro-
ducing a contradiction. In the classical proof this ensures that undesirable situations never
happen. In the interactive interpretation however, since P is not necessarily the lowest point,
no contradiction occurs. Instead, what happens is that we actually are in one of the cases
we had excluded in the classical proof. At this point, in order to deduce the contradictory
statement, we have partially computed the correctness computation returned by the Least El-
ement Lemma and thus discovered which assumption was incorrectly guessed. We compute
the relevant witness and extend the state accordingly. Then we compute a new lowest point
candidate and continue again following the proof of the Convex Angle Theorem until either
we can satisfy its conclusion or we backtrack again.
We use Lemma 8 in two places in the proof of the Convex Angle Theorem. The first use
takes place when, while iterating on the points, we discover that the bounding condition fails
for some S and we choose S as the new candidate for Q or R. We use Lemma 8 to show that
this choice satisfies the bounding condition for all the previous points we iterated over until
now. More precisely we use Lemma 8 to prove that, if the bounding conditions fails for S ,
then one of Q, R or S is strictly lower than P. As we described previously, this in turn starts
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the backtracking. Here is an example illustrating an interesting situation:
P Q
R
S
Here S is to the right of PQ, so we replace Q with S . From the picture we see that S
is actually strictly lower than P. On the other hand the bounding condition is satisfied by
taking S as P. In this situation, do we backtrack or not? We know that we can find a
better candidate for the lowest point, but P seems to be good enough already, so there is
no real need for a better candidate. Both options are sound and the choice depends on the
exact formalization of the proof and the exact sequences of rationals representing the vertical
coordinate of the points in question.
We also use Lemma 8 to claim that the bounding condition cannot fail because S is both
to the right of PQ and to the left of PR:
P
QR
S
This case was excluded completely in the classical proof, since it always leads to contra-
diction. When it occurs in the interactive interpretation, we backtrack for sure since the
bounding condition cannot be satisfied. More precisely, in this case Lemma 8 proves that
one of Q, R or S is strictly lower than P. Therefore, in order to get the contradiction, we
instance the assumptions yP ≤R yQ, yP ≤R yR and yP ≤R yS with enough precision to falsify
at least one of them.
As a last example, consider a situation where the state is empty and thus P is simply the
first point in the enumeration. Assume that the points are arranged as shown:
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P Q
R
S
Since the bounding condition is satisfied immediately, we never need to use Lemma 8. Thus
backtracking never ensues. This mean that P, while certainly not the lowest point, is a good
enough candidate and we do not need another one. This is one of the cases we mentioned
where the interactive interpretation produces a fast computation, since the lowest point is
only computed once and the proof ends with no backtracking. This shows how the behav-
ior of interactive interpretation of the Least Element Lemma depends heavily on the final
statement of the proof.
Appendix A
Appendix
A.1 Additional Reductions
In this section we list the standard reductions (given in [20]) that we did not need in order
to prove Lemma 4. The main reason is that in the proof we are only concerned with prin-
cipal branches and some reductions only affect non-principal branches. We list them for
completeness.
A.1.1 Permutative Reductions
We saw how the proper reductions are performed when the conclusion of an introduction
rule instance is the major premiss of a elimination rule instance. The situation becomes less
straightforward when the conclusion of an introduction rule instance α is a minor premiss of
an ∨E or ∃E rule instance γ whose conclusion is in turn the major premiss of an elimination
rule instance β. Also in this case the formula introduced by α is eliminated by β, but we
cannot apply a proper reduction since γ is in the way. What we can do is to rearrange the
derivation by moving β above (or “inside”) γ, so that β is immediately below α and we can
apply the suitable proper reduction. Therefore we have two permutative reductions, depend-
ing on whether γ is an instance of the ∨E or the ∃E rule. Note that repeated application of
the permutative reductions allows us to apply a proper reduction even when there is more
than one instance of the ∨E or the ∃E between α and β. Thus they can be thought of as
auxiliary reductions that can eventually enable a suitable proper reduction. They are listed
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in Figure A.1.
Figure A.1: The permutative reductions.
∨−perm
Π1
A1 ∨ A2
[A1]γ
Π2
B
[A2]γ
Π3
B∨E γB Π4∗E βC
↓
Π1
A1 ∨ A2
[A1]γ
Π2
B Π4∗E βC
[A2]γ
Π3
B Π4∗E βC∨E γC
∃−perm
Π1
∃x. A
[A[x B y]]γ
Π2
B∃E γB Π4∗E βC
↓
Π1
∃x. A
[A[x B y]]γ
Π2
B Π4∗E βC∃E γC
∗ is any logical connective: ∧,∨,→,∀,∃;
Π4 stands for the subderivations of the minor premisses (if any) of β.
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A.1.2 Immediate Simplifications
Consider a different kind of avoidable complexity in derivation: an instance α of the ∨E or
the ∃E rule such that the one of its minor premisses a is derived without using the assumption
discharged by α. More precisely this means that no occurrence of the assumption discharged
by α appears in the subderivation of a. Whenever this is the case we say that α is redundant
since we do not need the assumptions it provides in order to prove its conclusion. There are
two reductions, called immediate simplifications, depending on whether α is an instance of
the ∨E or the ∃E rule. They are listed in Figure A.2.
Figure A.2: The immediate simplifications.
∨−simpl
A1 ∨ A2
[A1]α
Π1
C
[A2]α
Π2
C∨E αC
{ Πi
C
if Πi does not depend on Ai
∃−simpl
∃x. A
[A[x B y]]α
Π
B∃E αB
{ Π
C
A.2 Witness Reduction in Two Steps
Instead of giving the single reduction Wit−red, we can split it in two distinct reductions, one
that looks for counterexamples and eliminates occurrences of the open assumptions of the
EM1 rule and one that eliminates instances of the EM1 rule when their conclusion can be
derived without the universal or existential assumption.
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A.2.1 A Lighter Witness Extracting Reduction
More precisely consider an instance α of the EM1 rule for the quantifier-free formula A:
[∀x. A]α
Π1
C
[¬A[x B y]]α
Π2
CEM1 αC
Let a be an occurrence of the assumption ∀x. A discharged by α in Π1 In order to be able to
perform the reduction we assume the following:
• a is the premiss of a ∀E instance β,
• the conclusion of β is the occurrence of a closed formula.
Let b be the conclusion of β. b is an occurrence of the closed quantifier-free formula A[x B t]
for some term t. Since closed quantifier-free formula are decidable, in the reduction we can
distinguish two cases, depending on whether A[x B t] is true or false.
• A[x B t] is true.
Let Π1 be a derivation of A[x B t] and replace β with Π1:
[∀x. A]α∀E A[x B t]
...
{
Π1
A[x B t]
...
• otherwise ¬A[x B t] is true.
Let Π2 be a derivation of ¬A[x B t] and replace all the occurrences of the assumption
¬A[x B t] discharged by α in the derivation of its rightmost premiss with Π2:
[¬A[x B y]]α
...
{
Π2
¬A[x B t]
...
We denote this reduction as Wit−red.
Whenever this reduction can be applied it removes one or more occurrences of one of
the assumptions discharged by α. If there are no more occurrences of such assumptions in
either Π1 or Π2 then α is redundant and can be deleted by EM1−simpl.
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A.2.2 Immediate Simplification
Redundant EM1 rule instances can be defined and reduced in the same way as redundant ∨E
instances. Consider an EM1 rule instance α such that one of its premisses is derived without
using the assumption discharged by α. Then we can reduce as follows:
[∀x. A]α
Π1
C
[¬A[x B y]]α
Π2
CEM1 αC
{ Σi
C
depending on whether it is Π1 or Π2 that contains no occurrence of the assumption dis-
charged by α. We denote this reduction as EM1−simpl.
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